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INTRODUCTION
When the exclusionary rule prevents the prosecution from using evidence
necessary to bring a case to trial, the rule deters illegality while raising no issue
about how it might interfere with usual factfinding processes. However, when a
case proceeds to trial although a court has suppressed some prosecution evidence,
courts need to decide the extent to which the defendant may benefit from the
absence of the proof without opening the door to its admission. The exclusion of
any relevant evidence raises similar questions, and courts often say the exclusion-
ary rule is a shield from suppressed evidence, but not a sword with which the
defendant can inflict damage on the prosecution’s remaining case.1 Nonetheless,
this Article argues courts err when they analyze whether the defendant “opened the
door” to suppressed evidence with a metaphor appropriate for rules excluding
evidence for different—and less weighty—reasons than encouraging respect for
individual constitutional rights. Employing usual evidentiary tests for opening the
door unduly diminishes the effectiveness of exclusion as a deterrent of police
misconduct when investigators expect the potential evidentiary payoff will not be
necessary to bring the case to trial, but will nonetheless be useful to obtain a
conviction.
Whether the defendant has opened the door to suppressed evidence is a related,
* Professor of Law and Brendan Moore Chair in Advocacy, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to
participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty Colloquium (especially Dan Capra) for comments and to Joshua
Mitts and Katherine Rudish for research assistance. © 2013, James L. Kainen.
1. See People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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though distinct question from what the boundaries of the exclusionary rule should
be. The Supreme Court has defined the scope of the exclusionary rule to the extent
of holding suppressed evidence can be used to impeach a testifying defendant, but
not to establish the prosecution’s case-in-chief or to impeach other defense
witnesses.2 Besides the direct questions of scope are questions about how defen-
dants may exploit the absence of suppressed evidence before a court will hold that
the defendant opened the door to its admission. This Article criticizes recent
decisions finding a defendant opens the door to suppressed evidence merely by
highlighting the absence of that evidence or by offering other evidence to which
the suppressed proof is relevant rebuttal.3 It argues those decisions erroneously
assume relevance, probative value, and unfair prejudice are the only factors that
should influence this decision. While this is true enough for evidence originally
excluded to promote accurate factfinding, it is not true for evidence excluded to
promote other policy objectives or to respect other principles.
Whether and how a party can take advantage of the exclusion of suppressed
evidence is a question whose answer depends upon a contextual analysis of how
“opening the door” decisions affect the deterrence promoted by exclusion in the
first instance, not upon whether they divert the factfinder in its quest for truth.
Thus, courts contravene the prohibition against impeaching defense witnesses
when they invoke Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to preclude the
defendant from admitting evidence that contradicts suppressed proof, because
preclusion has the same effect as rebuttal. Similarly, courts improperly extend the
prosecution’s use of illegally-obtained evidence when they allow it to discourage
counsel from arguing inferences the suppressed proof contradicts by permitting its
admission if he does. In either case, the prosecution quickly learns obtaining
evidence illegally has a payoff in excess of that contemplated by the Supreme
Court. Prosecutors routinely find the suppressed evidence useful to deter or rebut
defenses even when not introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief or to
impeach a testifying defendant.4 This is precisely the result rejected by the Court in
James v. Illinois because of the increased incentive to obtain the evidence
illegally.5
2. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313 (1990); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954); James L.
Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles and Politics, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1301 (1992) (discussing the scope of the impeachment exception). The Court has yet to decide whether
prosecutors may use suppressed evidence to impeach defendants’ hearsay declarations. See generally James L.
Kainen, Truth, Deterrence, and the Impeachment Exception, 86 OR. L. REV. 1017 (2007) (analyzing consequences
of allowing suppressed evidence to impeach nontestifying defendants’ hearsay declarations).
3. See generally Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228; People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 28, 2008).
4. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 318 (“The United States argues that this result is constitutionally
acceptable because excluding illegally-obtained evidence solely from the prosecution’s case in chief would still
provide a quantum of deterrence sufficient to protect the privacy interests underlying the exclusionary rule. We
disagree.”).
5. See id. at 313.
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It may seem obvious that factfinding accuracy or completeness is not itself
sufficient reason to admit evidence whose exclusion was mandated in the first
instance despite interference with—rather than in pursuit of—those goals. How-
ever, courts too frequently forget the point when they hold fairness or the integrity
of the trial process justifies holding a defendant has taken improper advantage of
evidence’s suppression and thus invited its admission.6 Using muscle memory to
rule, they interpret fairness as adversarial fairness, which always counsels in favor
of admitting relevant rebuttal. Similarly, they interpret the integrity of the trial
process to require advocates to refrain from using evidence’s exclusion to
(mis)lead the factfinder to a conclusion inconsonant with the excluded evidence.
That approach, too, always counsels in favor of admitting as rebuttal the evidence
that was excluded in the first instance. Lost in the analysis is the effect holding the
door opened has on the goal promoted by the exclusionary rule. Courts apparently
assume no damage will be done if they allow the defendant to use exclusion only
as a shield from illegally-obtained evidence, but not as a sword to advance an
inference or elicit proof contradicted by the excluded evidence.7
This Article shows the question is more complex than the sword and shield
metaphor suggests. Discouraging the defendant from arguing inferences from the
proof’s absence, or from presenting his own evidence that excluded evidence may
contradict, imposes a cost on the defendant and creates a benefit for the prosecu-
tion that can interfere as unacceptably with the goals advanced by exclusion as
allowing the evidence in the first instance. That is the lesson of ordinary evidence
rules that, like the constitutional exclusionary rule, justify exclusion for reasons
besides factfinding accuracy. They prohibit uses of evidence that interfere with
goals besides accurate factfinding even when the protected party advances claims
that make the excluded evidence particularly probative. As those rules show, there
can be no general “opening the door” standard because the issue depends on the
contextual effect on exclusion’s goal. Questions about whether the door has been
opened require courts to consider the same kind of factors that enter into framing
exclusionary rules in the first place, not general notions of fairness and integrity or
the metaphoric difference between using exclusion as a shield, not as a sword.
Part I shows how a court recently used a finding that counsel opened the door to
weaken—indeed, effectively to ignore—a holding by the Supreme Court that
specifically prohibits the use of suppressed evidence, even as impeachment or
rebuttal. By failing to recognize how suppressed evidence is useful to deter as well
as rebut defenses, courts fail to appreciate how ruling that a defendant opens the
door to suppressed evidence by capitalizing on its absence can give the prosecution
much, if not all, of the benefit that exclusion was meant to prevent.
6. See, e.g., Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 246; Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *38–42.
7. See Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 246 (“The Miranda holding was designed to protect the defendant. It was
not intended to give him a sword to go after the other side.”).
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Part II shows how courts apply an improperly broad view of what it takes to
open the door to suppressed evidence when they treat such evidence as if it was
excluded for reasons of factfinding accuracy. Instead, such decisions need to be
made specifically to avoid undermining the goal of exclusion that has already been
placed ahead of factfinding accuracy, even as some limited circumstances support
finding defendants waived their protection against illegally-obtained evidence.
The idea of taking unfair advantage of exclusion must respect the compromise to
factfinding that the Court holds necessary to deter illegal investigative actions.
Even just a few cases improperly holding counsel opened the door have a dramatic
effect unless explicitly repudiated. The threat of forfeiting the defendant’s immu-
nity from suppressed evidence encourages defense counsel to avoid taking any
advantage of the absence of the proof a court might possibly interpret as opening
the door. Therefore, the prosecution will always benefit from foreclosing potential
defenses unless courts reverse course to make clear how defendants can exploit the
absence of the suppressed evidence without risking the evidence’s admission.
Part III shows that a narrower view of opening the door in this circumstance is
not at odds with the integrity of our factfinding process nor with the advocate’s
accepted ethical role within it. The integrity of that process is relative to the limited
task of jurors: considering only the universe of evidence admitted at trial, rather
than pursuing a self-directed quest for truth. Restrictions on the evidence juries
hear reflect the systematic pursuit of justice of which accurate factfinding is not the
exclusive component. Jurors, lawyers and judges fulfill critical yet limited roles in
this pursuit even when they reach, advocate, or countenance verdicts that deviate
from accurate factfinding in pursuit of other goals. Allowing the defense to
emphasize the absence of suppressed evidence, therefore, can be a necessary part
of the integrity of the factfinding process, not its antithesis.
I. THE FLIGHT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The assumption that defendants open the door to suppressed evidence when
they increase its probativity by capitalizing on its absence to offer contrary
evidence, or to argue a contrary inference, can effectively eviscerate the deterrent
effect of exclusion. As a practical matter, the “opening the door” policy has its
largest impact on incentives to conduct improper custodial interrogations, which
are typically undertaken after the prosecution concludes it has or will have
sufficient evidence besides that obtained from the interrogation to take the
defendant to trial.8 Still, the courts’ approach informs law enforcement’s calculus
to take other improper investigatory measures whenever suppressing their fruits
8. The Court’s primary justification for the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of illegal police conduct. See,
e.g., United States et al. v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536–39
(1975)) (“The Court, however, has established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter
future unlawful police conduct.’”); Tirado v. Comm’r, 689 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at
453–54 (“[A]ny extension of the rule beyond its core application . . . must be justified by balancing the ‘additional
62 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:59
does not eliminate any expected payoff at trial.9 By defining what opens the door to
admission of the suppressed proof, the courts decide what steps defendants must
forego at trial to avoid the suppressed evidence. By requiring the defendant to
forego those steps or invite the evidence, the courts define the prosecution’s payoff
for having undertaken the unlawful investigatory measure even if the defendant
refrains from opening the door to the evidence. Acquisition of the unlawfully-
obtained evidence benefits the prosecution whether introduced to rebut or bran-
dished to deter the defense case. So its possession is always potentially useful at
trial unless the prosecution cannot survive a motion for judgment of acquittal
without it.
The perception, however, that defendants taking advantage of the absence of
suppressed evidence justify its admission is powerful. It has led courts to deny that
suppressed evidence is illegally used when they rely on it to prevent defendants
from introducing contrary proof as misleading, even though the Supreme Court
has specifically prohibited introducing the suppressed evidence as impeachment or
rebuttal. Although those courts deny the prosecution benefits from illegally-
obtained evidence it has not introduced, its utility to deter a defense case is
manifest. As a matter of logic and now well-accepted economic theory, a foregone
opportunity to gain a specified amount represents a cost potentially as significant
as payment of that amount.10 Economists often concretize this concept of an
opportunity cost by comparing a decision maker’s decision to reject an offer to not
engage in an activity with a decision to pay the specified amount to engage in the
activity.11 In either case, the decision is costly, potentially equally so. By the same
token, the defendant suffers a cost at trial (and the prosecution receives a benefit)
from the prosecution’s possession of illegal evidence whether he avoids its
admission by foregoing otherwise advantageous defenses or suffers its admission
in response to opening the door by presenting those defenses. That the defendant
will presumably choose the strategy that minimizes the impact of the illegally-
obtained proof does not prevent the prosecution from realizing its benefit—to deter
or rebut defenses—despite the defendant’s choice.
The substantial value of unlawfully-obtained evidence to deter defense evidence
marginal deterrence’ of the extension against the cost to the public interest of further impairing the pursuit of
truth.”).
9. For example, the decision to conduct a search in an ongoing investigation may reflect a belief that its fruits
will be useful even if the prosecution cannot use them in its case-in-chief. Current case law encourages that belief
by teaching investigators that, routinely, suppressed evidence, inadmissible on the prosecution’s case-in-chief,
will nonetheless be useful to rebut or deter defenses.
10. The concept of opportunity cost in economic theory dates to the nineteenth century. See generally David I.
Green, Pain-Cost and Opportunity-Cost, 8 Q. J. ECON. 218, 224 (1894) (“[W]hen we once recognize the sacrifice
of opportunity as an element in the cost of production, we find that the principle has a very wide application.”).
11. See generally T. W. McRae, Opportunity and Incremental Cost: An Attempt to Define in Systems Terms, 45
ACCT. REV. 315, 316 (1970) (quoting L.M. FRASER, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 103–04 (1937) (“The
cost of a thing is simply the amount of other things which has to be given up for its sake . . . . Cost value is . . .
merely exchange value seen from the side of the buyer, rather than the seller.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was made glaringly obvious in the recent case of People v. Johnson12 in which the
court, relying on suppressed evidence, undertook itself to prohibit a defendant
from offering evidence whose rebuttal the exclusionary rule prohibits. There,
prosecutors sought to exclude defense evidence suggesting the crime for which
they charged Johnson was committed by a darker-skinned, similar-looking man,
perhaps Johnson’s cousin, Thaddeus.13 Prosecutors originally charged Johnson
and an accomplice with a string of five gas station robberies including one
involving an attendant named Claussen.14 They asserted all the robberies were
committed with a “mode of operation” that was “virtually the same.”15 After
Claussen failed to identify Johnson in a lineup, instead noting his robber was
darker-skinned, prosecutors dropped the Claussen robbery from the case against
Johnson while retaining it in the case against Johnson’s accomplice.16 Johnson
now sought to call Claussen to testify to the exculpatory non-identification.17 The
prosecution objected, noting Johnson’s statement, suppressed because of a Mi-
randa violation, included Johnson’s confession to the Claussen robbery.18
Had the defense called Claussen, James v. Illinois19 would have prevented
admission of Johnson’s suppressed statement to contradict Claussen’s testimony.20
Prosecutors sought to exclude Claussen’s testimony pursuant to § 352 of the
California Evidence Code,21 which essentially mirrors Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.22 They argued the court should consider the suppressed
confession when deciding whether the probative value of Claussen’s uncontra-
dicted testimony was substantially outweighed by its tendency to mislead the jury.
Although conceding the only reason not to allow Johnson to call Claussen was its
knowledge of inadmissible proof contradicting Claussen’s anticipated testimony,23
the court granted the prosecutor’s motion.24 It reasoned the confession was not
12. 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
13. Id. at 245.
14. Id. at 234, 237.
15. Id. at 234.
16. Id. at 237, 244.
17. Id. at 245.
18. Id.
19. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
20. James prevents impeachment of a witness other than the defendant with suppressed evidence. See id. at
308–09.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2011) (“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”).
22. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
23. In addition to Johnson’s suppressed confession, the court also knew his confederate had implicated him in
the Claussen robbery in a confession to police that was inadmissible against Johnson pursuant to the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause. See People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
24. Id. at 246.
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“used” in violation of James when the court relied on it to prevent the defendant
from introducing defense evidence misleading in its absence, while nonetheless
conceding that, had the defendant elicited Claussen’s testimony without objection,
James would preclude admitting the confession.25
The court’s reasons for distinguishing between using suppressed evidence to
exclude exculpatory evidence the suppressed proof contradicts, and allowing its
admission after the defendant introduced the exculpatory evidence, belies its claim
that the suppressed evidence is only “used” in the latter circumstance. To begin
with, the court noted the jury did not use the confession to decide Johnson’s guilt
because the jury did not hear it.26 But by virtue of the prosecution’s possession of
the suppressed evidence and motion to exclude, the jury was not permitted to hear
Claussen’s testimony either. So the suppressed confession surely determined the
evidence the court allowed the jury to hear, potentially influencing its decision
about Johnson’s guilt. Indeed, the Johnson court conceded as much when it next
attempted to show the evidence’s undoubted influence on the jury’s deliberation
was somehow consistent with James’ holding that the balance between truthseek-
ing at trial and deterrence of police misconduct does not justify allowing impeach-
ment of defense witnesses besides defendants.27 Yet it was no more successful on
this score.
First, the court tried to argue, in contrast to James, truthseeking supported
precluding Claussen’s testimony because “it prevents false or misleading argument
from being made to the jury,” and “[t]he only defense chilled . . . was a false
defense.”28 But this does not distinguish James at all. The question in James was
whether the jury should consider the defense witness’s testimony that James
looked different on the night of the murder than prosecution witnesses described
him, without considering his suppressed admission that, in fact, he appeared as the
prosecution’s witnesses described.29 The argument for admitting the inculpatory
statement the Supreme Court rejected was exactly the same as that accepted by the
Johnson court: It would prevent the jury from relying on false or misleading
argument while potentially chilling only a false defense.30 At most, the James
Court held the truthseeking value of testimony offered by defense witnesses as a
class would generally exceed that of defendants; it hardly claimed truthseeking
itself could ever justify excluding evidence in a particular case that would be
admissible rebuttal evidence had it been legally obtained. Precluding defense
evidence in the name of truthseeking whose rebuttal James disallows despite its
acknowledged contribution to truthseeking in the particular case is to take a trip
25. See id. at 255.
26. Id. at 250–51.
27. Id. at 251–52.
28. Id. at 251.
29. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 309–10 (1990).
30. See id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (James allows unrebutted perjury-by-proxy).
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down the rabbit hole into the world of Alice in Wonderland. To prevent James’
witness from testifying because his testimony contradicts James’ confession
accomplishes exactly what the James Court rejected when it disallowed the
witness’s rebuttal with James’ confession. Had the Court allowed the rebuttal,
James undoubtedly would not have called the witness, yielding the same outcome
as in Johnson. The James court did not suggest its holding could be circumvented
by excluding defense evidence whose rebuttal it prohibited.
The same fundamental error undermined the Johnson court’s analysis of
deterrence when it held precluding a defense witness’s testimony—unlike allow-
ing its rebuttal as the James Court prohibited—would not “weaken the exclusion-
ary rule’s deterrent effect.”31 It asserted no decrease in deterrence would result
because precluding defense witnesses whose testimony was contracted by sup-
pressed evidence “did not increase the number of witnesses against which the
confession could be used, nor did it significantly increase the occasions on which
the confession could be used.”32 But this claim rests upon the same erroneously
crabbed conception of what it means to “use” the evidence. The court’s own
analysis conceded its ruling would prevent any “false and misleading argument”
and ultimately deter any “false defense,” not just those put forth by a defendant’s
testimony.33
That was exactly the extension of the impeachment exception that the James
Court rejected when it held allowing impeachment of defense witnesses besides
defendants with illegally-obtained evidence would unjustifiably diminish deter-
rence of police misconduct. The Johnson court called it “too speculative and
tenuous” to envision a scenario wherein a law enforcement officer would see a
benefit in obtaining evidence useful to preclude a defense witness from testifying,
but it is clearly no less likely to influence prosecutorial behavior than the prospect
of using the same evidence to rebut or deter the defense witness’s testimony.34 The
incentive to unlawful conduct created by the Johnson court is no more “speculative
and tenuous” than that rejected as intolerable in James. In fact, since the likely
result if James allowed rebuttal would be to deter the defense witness from
testifying, Johnson not only reduces deterrence in exactly the manner that James
rejected, it approves the same outcome James rejected.
Finally, the Johnson court even seemed to concede the equivalence of preclud-
ing defense testimony and allowing its rebuttal when it analogized its facts to that
of People v. Payne.35 In Payne, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed admission of a
suppressed handgun after defense counsel asked the seizing officer on cross-
31. See People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 251.
34. Id. at 250.
35. 456 N.E.2d 44 (Ill. 1983).
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examination whether he had searched the defendant’s apartment.36 After the
officer replied that he had indeed searched the premises, counsel asked no further
questions. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce the weapon seized in the
illegal search “to rebut the false impression created by the cross-examination that
nothing was recovered from the apartment.”37 Calling Payne similar to Johnson,
the Johnson court said it reached the “same result” when it precluded the witness
contradicted by the suppressed evidence, although the Payne court had admitted
the evidence after the witness testified.38 At the end of the day, what mattered to the
Johnson court—and what led it to find precedent in Payne rather than James—was
not whether defense evidence was excluded in the first instance, deterred by the
prospect of rebuttal, or actually rebutted. Using the motion to exclude as an
opportunity to evade James’ holding, the Johnson Court acted on its perception
that Johnson, like Payne, would “open the door” to use of the suppressed proof by
“affirmatively misrepresent[ing] or falsely imply[ing]” the facts of the case.39
Whether the remedy was allowing the prosecution to use the suppressed proof to
prohibit, deter, or rebut the defense evidence, the point was to forestall the
“defendant’s attempt to use Miranda as a sword to force the jury to consider a false
and misleading argument,” even if extrapolated from truthful testimony.40
The essence of the court’s argument, therefore, was not about whether the
suppressed evidence had been “used” in a prohibited sense; it clearly had. Instead,
it relied on the view—similar to that expressed by the Payne court—that the
prohibition must yield in appropriate circumstances because “allowing the de-
fense . . . to misrepresent to the jury the actual facts of the case is . . . [in]consis-
tent with the proper functioning and continued integrity of the judicial system.”41
In fact, that view influenced the Johnson court strongly enough to construe “use”
of suppressed evidence in a fashion clearly inconsistent with James, but consistent
with Payne’s allowance of suppressed evidence absent an applicable exception to
the exclusionary rule if the door has been opened. The appellate court in Johnson
quoted approvingly from the trial judge’s analysis as follows:
But . . . contrary to the Court’s responsibility to the integrity of the judicial
system and of the trial itself, the integrity of the system has to stand for
something, and if the Court were to consider what’s before me and affirma-
tively conclude that the uncharged offense which the Court makes a factual
finding is something that the defendant and not Mr. Taylor did based upon the
defendant’s own statement and the statement of Ms. Holmes, the Court would
36. Id. at 49.
37. People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Payne, 456 N.E.2d at 46).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 251.
41. Id. at 252 (citing Payne, 456 N.E.2d at 46–47).
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be complicitous in putting inaccurate, confusing and misleading information
before the jury.42
Crediting the suppressed evidence rather than the proposed defense witness’s
testimony,43 the court concluded admitting the latter without rebuttal—James
notwithstanding—would undermine the integrity of the courts and of the trial
itself.44 If James precluded it from allowing the prosecution to rebut the defense
witness, the court would prevent him from testifying at all.
The Johnson case illustrates how a court’s finding that a defendant justified the
use of suppressed evidence by offering contrary proof can undermine even an
application of the exclusionary rule the Supreme Court has explicitly approved. It
therefore provides an important occasion to consider if courts should find defen-
dants opened the door to suppressed evidence by taking improper advantage of its
absence at trial, even if no established exception to the exclusionary rule permit-
ting its use applies. Johnson shows how the effectiveness of exclusion as a
deterrent depends as importantly on case-by-case determinations about whether
defendants opened the door to suppressed evidence as it does on the scope of
rule-based exceptions to the exclusionary rule.45
Besides defining those exceptions, and taking a broad view of evidence allowed
42. Id. at 246.
43. Id. That the court was willing to base its decision on the version of the facts it credited shows the length to
which it was willing to go to prevent admission of what it believed to be inaccurate information. Ordinarily, courts
balance the probative value of evidence against its capacity to mislead on the assumption that the jury may choose
to credit the challenged evidence. See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 143 (5th
ed. 2011) (citing United States v. Wallace, 124 F. App’x 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he credibility of a witness
has nothing to do with whether or not his testimony is probative with respect to the fact which it seeks to prove.”);
22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5214 (2012) (noting
when balancing probative value against prejudice and capacity to mislead the jury, “courts do not count the
witness’s credibility,” but rather “[t]he prevailing view is that evaluating the credibility of witnesses is a matter
uniquely within the competence of the jury, and that the judge’s role is to estimate the probative value of
testimony if believed.”) (emphasis added).
44. See People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 251–52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
45. Moreover, even if defendants are able to obtain an advance ruling from the court about what evidence or
argument opens the door to suppressed evidence, they may waive their right to appeal by refraining from taking
the steps to invite the proof, making opening the door decisions as unreviewable as they may be unpredictable.
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984) (a criminal defendant must testify to appeal a decision to admit
the defendant’s prior conviction for impeachment); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002)
(defendant must elicit the adverse evidence that was deemed admissible under Rule 404(b) on defendant’s pretrial
motion in order to preserve appellate review); United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2002)
(defendant’s claim that the district court violated his right to remain silent in allowing the government to introduce
evidence from defendant’s “selective silence” if defendant were to bring up issue of an associate held to be
unreviewable on appeal since defendant never introduced issue “and cannot . . . attack a potential introduction of
evidence by the government in response to his potential testimony”); United States v. Bond, 87 F.3d 695, 700–01
(5th Cir. 1996) (defendant must testify to appeal in limine ruling that his testimony would waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege); United States v. Goldman, 41 F.3d 785, 788 (1st Cir. 1994) (defendant must testify to
appeal Rule 403 and 404 rulings regarding his potential testimony); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 905–06
(2d Cir. 1988) (defendant must actually pursue defense at trial to appeal ruling that uncharged misconduct is
admissible if the defendant pursues that defense); United States v. DiMatteo, 759 F.2d 831, 833 (11th Cir. 1985) (a
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to impeach a testifying defendant,46 the Supreme Court has yet to provide
guidance on how courts are to approach questions about opening the door in the
context of suppressed proof when the defendant does not testify. Consequently, the
question depends on what the courts see as the appropriate, analogous evidentiary
test, borrowed from other contexts. Much of the vitality of the exclusionary rule at
trial hangs in the balance; by deciding what constitutes taking improper advantage
of suppression, courts decide the extent of the benefit derived from obtaining
evidence illegally when it is inevitably used to rebut or deter potential defenses.
II. ACCURATE FACTFINDING AND SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE
Left to evidentiary analogies, courts apply an improperly broad view of what it
takes to open the door to suppressed evidence when they treat it as if it were
excluded for factfinding reasons. Decisions about whether the door has been
opened to evidence excluded to promote factfinding focus exclusively on the
balance between the evidence’s probative value and its capacity for distracting or
prejudicing the jury. Once counsel highlights the absence of the evidence or elicits
proof it contradicts, she increases the probative value of the suppressed evidence in
a way likely, if not certain, to justify admission. Consequently, the appropriate
analogy to deciding whether the door has been opened is provided by rules
excluding evidence for reasons other than factfinding accuracy. Only if courts
model their decisions on those rules will they assure the constitutional goals of
exclusion consistently take precedence over factfinding accuracy to the extent that
existing doctrine requires. Using that approach, courts should find defendants open
the door to suppressed evidence only when they waive constitutional protection by
seeking to benefit from evidence enabled by the illegality about which they
complain, not when they merely take advantage of the evidence’s absence.
Section A uses a recent case to illustrate the importance of finding the proper
metric to decide whether a defendant takes unfair advantage of the absence of
suppressed evidence and thus opens the door. Section B shows employing a
standard derived from factfinding accuracy improperly diminishes the deterrent
effect of exclusion by routinely admitting suppressed evidence to contradict
exculpatory proof and inferences. To sustain deterrence, courts must model their
decisions on evidence rules that prohibit the use of contradicting evidence in
pursuit of other goals. Section C shows how prohibiting contradicting evidence is
defendant’s witness must testify to appeal a decision allowing his impeachment with evidence offered under Rule
608).
46. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1980) (any questions “suggested to a reasonably
competent cross-examiner” by defendant’s direct testimony are permissible, allowing the prosecutor to use
suppressed evidence to impeach statements made in response to cross-examination “reasonably suggested” by the
direct examination along with the direct testimony itself); see also id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the limit on
the scope of contradiction of a defendant’s testimony amounts to “nothing more than a constitutional reflection of
the common-law evidentiary rule of relevance”).
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appropriate even if effective exploitation of its absence leads jurors to conclude
that it does not exist. The unavoidable possibility that they conclude from the lack
of expected evidence that it was not found confers no improper evidentiary
advantage and cannot justify admission without unduly undermining deterrence.
Nonetheless, Section D shows how allowing the defendant to employ exculpatory
inferences from the absence of suppressed proof still allows for appropriate limits
on his ability to exploit exclusion. When a defendant seeks to use evidence derived
from an illegal investigatory step to make himself better off than he would be
absent the illegality, he waives his objection by opening a subject that was closed
for his benefit.
A. Opening the Door to Suppressed Evidence
The importance of deciding what opens the door to suppressed evidence is
illustrated by the recent case of People v. Fregoso.47 In Fregoso, the court
suppressed clothing seized from the defendant pursuant to an illegal arrest.48 The
prosecution tested the clothing for plant residue consistent with the cornfield that
was the site for the murder with whose commission they charged Fregoso.49 It also
compared footprints found at the scene with the sneakers seized from Fregoso.50
Although the prosecution’s experts found no plant material matching the cornfield
on his clothing, they offered to testify that a footprint was consistent with the
defendant’s left sneaker.51
Upon learning that the plant residue tests were negative, the defendant sought an
order allowing him to offer evidence of the results without opening the door to
admission of the footprints evidence.52 The court denied the motion, finding the
defendant could not offer the residue evidence to show he was not at the scene
without opening the door to the footprint evidence suggesting he was.53 The
defendant then sought to “waive that portion of the suppression order relating to
the upper clothes, but not the shoes,” but “[t]he court declined defense counsel’s
offer and reaffirmed its ruling.”54
The prosecution called the criminalist who examined the cornfield. She testified
to her observations, taking photographs and collecting evidence, but did not
specifically mention collecting plant material or discovering and photographing
footprints.55 Before cross-examining her, defense counsel sought a ruling that he
would not open the door to the sneaker-match evidence by eliciting that the
47. No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
48. Id. at *14.
49. See id. at *14–15.
50. Id. at *14.
51. See id. at *14–15.
52. Id. at *14.
53. Id. at *15.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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criminalist had taken plant samples and photographed footprints at the scene.56
After the court asked how the defense would use that evidence, counsel replied
“there was no evidence of Fregoso’s footprints at the scene of the crime.”57 The
Court denied the motion, noting there would be no such evidence “[b]ecause it was
suppressed. So you opened the door, you can’t do that. If you get in the footprints,
it opens the door up.”58 Subsequently, the court explained “it would be unfair for
the defense to use the clothing to argue Fregoso was not at the crime scene, when
the shoes arguably did link him to the scene.”59 Later, the court held its ruling
would apply equally to counsel’s offering photos of footprints at the scene that did
not match the defendant’s suppressed sneakers, because they, like the exculpatory
clothing, would open the door.60
Defense counsel recalled the criminalist and elicited that she had collected plant
material from the cornfield, but not that she had observed or photographed
footprints.61 The court warned counsel that if she mentioned the absence of “trace
evidence found on your client’s clothes or shoes” in summation, he would permit
the prosecution to reopen its case to introduce the suppressed sneaker to show that
it was consistent with footprints found at the scene.62 He said he could not
“separate the clothing with the trace evidence . . . and the shoes,” “because the
clothes and shoes were both suppressed.”63 When defense counsel said in summa-
tion, “[d]id you notice that there was no evidence presented by the prosecution
connecting my client to [the] cornfield?,” the court interrupted him and told the
jury that it would hear more evidence.64 It told counsel that because his claim that
no evidence connected the defendant to the scene “was based on the ruling
suppressing your client’s clothing,” there was no “excuse for what you did . . .
except to mislead the jury.”65 The court then allowed the prosecution to introduce
the suppressed sneaker and evidence of its consistency with the footprint, and the
defendant to rebut with “evidence that no plant material from the crime scene was
found on Fregoso’s clothing.”66
The appellate court avoided ruling on the trial court’s allowing the prosecution
to reopen its case to introduce the suppressed evidence by holding introduction of
the sneaker evidence harmless, if error at all.67 More importantly, however, it
noted it was only concerned about the actual introduction of the suppressed
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *16.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *17.
67. Id. at *18.
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evidence.68 It agreed with the trial court that defense counsel was properly
precluded from arguing no evidence connected the defendant and the cornfield69
because “[a]n attorney commits misconduct by commenting on the adversary’s
failure to produce evidence the attorney knows was excluded by the court.”70
Consequently, the court allowed the prosecution’s possession of the suppressed
evidence to benefit it by disallowing comment on the proof’s absence, including
how its absence bears on whether the admitted evidence showed guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.71 It worried only that the trial court had not just prohibited the
argument, but had allowed the prosecution to reopen its case actually to introduce
the suppressed evidence.72
For analytic purposes, this Article distinguishes the idea that the door is opened
by counsel’s taking improper evidentiary advantage of suppression from the idea
that counsel attempting to do so violates generally applicable ethical rules.
Because the courts are not always entirely clear in their reasoning, and because the
two ideas can reinforce each other since taking “improper” evidentiary advantage
can also reflect unethical practice, distinguishing the approaches is sometimes
difficult. Nonetheless, some courts have held counsel opened the door to sup-
pressed evidence without necessarily engaging in unethical practice, suggesting
evidence law justifies the evidence’s admission as a matter of “fairness”73 and the
“integrity of the trial process.”74 In contrast, some courts have cited generally
applicable ethics principles as a primary determinant of the kind of actions that
justifies a court’s finding that counsel has taken improper advantage.75 The
distinction may help explain why the Fregoso appellate court avoided approving
introduction of the suppressed proof. As a remedy for counsel’s unethical conduct,
allowing the prosecution to introduce the suppressed evidence may not be
necessary or appropriate.76 As a consequence of counsel’s choosing an evidentiary
strategy that makes it admissible rebuttal, however, allowing the prosecution to
68. Id. at *17.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
71. Id.; cf. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (“Here the prosecutor not only argued the ‘lack’ of evidence where the
defense was ready and willing to produce it, but he compounded that tactic by actually arguing that the
complaining witness was not a prostitute, although he had seen the official records and knew that he was arguing a
falsehood.”).
72. People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008) (“[T]he trial court
here went far beyond preventing defense counsel’s misconduct and, in doing so, entered the realm of possible
constitutional error.”).
73. Id. at *17 (“The trial court considered allowing the People to reopen and put on the evidence as the ‘only
fair way to cure it.’”).
74. People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting trial court).
75. Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *17.
76. See Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728, 732–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting existing rules prevent or
mitigate the impact of improper closing arguments and concluding that defense counsel’s misleading closing
argument did not justify introducing a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution); see infra note 139 and
accompanying text.
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introduce the suppressed evidence is unexceptional. The remainder of Part II
discusses the evidentiary dimensions of opening the door to suppressed evidence,
while Part III addresses the ethical aspect.
B. Contradicted Inferences or Proof
The initial evidentiary issue posed by the analyses of the Fregoso and Johnson
courts is whether arguing the lack of evidence or eliciting contradicted proof—
without more—opens the door to suppressed evidence because it misleads the jury
about facts contradicted by the suppressed evidence. That is the crux of the
Johnson court’s claim that because “to misrepresent to the jury the actual facts of
the case is . . . [in]consistent with the proper functioning and continued integrity of
the judicial system,”77 even evidence clearly inadmissible as proof of guilt or
impeachment may be used to prevent the defense from introducing evidence
contradicted by the excluded proof. Since “James said nothing about a defendant’s
attempt to use Miranda as a sword to force the jury to consider a false and
misleading argument,” the court asserted, normal rules for opening the door to
excluded evidence should apply to allow it.78 A similar assumption informed the
Fregoso trial court’s holding that arguing the lack of evidence the court had
excluded was sufficient to allow its admission when the alternative would allow a
jury to draw an inaccurate inference79 and the appellate court’s view that, at the
very least, the argument would be improper.80
Although suggesting the jury should not be mislead by argument about the lack
of suppressed evidence may seem noncontroversial and benign, it misses the
critical point that what opens the door to excluded evidence must depend upon the
reason we excluded the proof in the first place. Whether a party has opened the
door to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a question that can arise when applying
(at least) three distinct kinds of evidentiary rules. The first encompasses rules
designed to protect policies and principles internal to the accuracy of the factfind-
ing process itself. Application of Rules 404 and 403 to prohibit character evidence,
but nonetheless allow proof of other wrongs, crimes, or acts when they are
sufficiently probative for a non-character purpose, provides a good example. We
intend the rules to insulate the jury from evidence that can distract it from accurate
factfinding about matters that the substantive law defines as material.
The second encompasses rules created, at least in part, to prevent the factfinding
77. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 252 (quoting People v. Payne, 456 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ill. 1983)).
78. Id. at 251.
79. See Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16–17 (“[W]hen you argued just now to the jurors that there was no
evidence presented by the prosecutor connecting your client to the cornfield, that was based on the ruling
suppressing your client’s clothing . . . . [T]here is [no] excuse for what you did . . . except to mislead the jury so
we are going to put on evidence.”).
80. See id. at *17 (“An attorney commits misconduct by commenting on the adversary’s failure to produce
evidence the attorney knows was excluded by the court.”) (citing People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983)).
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process from interfering with other important, though nonconstitutional, policies
and principles. The federal rules’ prohibition of subsequent remedial measures,81
settlements and settlement discussions,82 and withdrawn guilty pleas and plea
negotiations83 provide good examples. The third encompasses the constitutional
exclusionary rule that is the focus of cases discussed in this Article. We intend it to
prevent the factfinding process from presenting too great an incentive for authori-
ties to intrude upon the constitutional policies and principles that exclusion seeks
to promote by according them precedence over normal evidentiary policy.84
The easy claim that an attorney’s taking advantage of the lack of evidence she
has successfully excluded opens the door to its admission can make perfect sense
only when applied to the first type of rules—those internal to the factfinding
process. Exclusion in that case ultimately depends upon a balance of the evi-
dence’s probative value and potential to unfairly prejudice the jury in its evaluation
of the facts or to mislead the jury about the issues we ask them to decide. The
initial decision to exclude thus depends on the excluded evidence’s lack of
probative value when properly used on a material issue. Comment on the absence
of the excluded evidence brings the issue to which the excluded proof is relevant to
the fore, increasing its probative value. Just as a defendant may increase its
probative value by eliciting evidence from a prosecution or defense witness to
establish a defense which the excluded evidence rebuts, defense counsel’s argu-
ment in summation or assertions in opening may also raise questions that increase
the evidence’s probative value. As its probative worth increases, the judge must
decide whether the accuracy of the factfinding process now demands that the
previously excluded evidence be admitted, or counsel be prevented from taking the
steps that would justify its admission. Since we uncontroversially intend the
application of factfinding rules to further the accuracy of the process, it would
hardly be surprising to learn courts generally find the door has been opened to
excluded evidence. When defense counsel first argues successfully that prosecu-
tion evidence is not probative enough to justify its potential to detract from
factfinding accuracy, but then belies that claim by highlighting the evidence’s
absence, he demonstrates how probative it now is to rebutting the defense case.
Application of Rules 403 and 404(b) provide a classic example. The Court must
first consider whether there is a permissible (non-action-in-conformity-with-
81. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
82. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 410.
84. Although the Court has decided neither Miranda nor the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is
constitutionally mandated, it is clear that their purpose is to promote constitutional values. See, e.g., Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702–03 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Like the
suppression of the fruits of an illegal search or seizure, the exclusion of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda is not constitutionally required. This Court repeatedly has held that Miranda’s warning requirement is
not a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself, but a prophylactic rule . . . [which] promotes institutional respect for
constitutional values.”).
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character) inference from the challenged evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts.85 Then, it must consider whether there is sufficient evidence to persuade a
reasonable jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the other crimes, wrongs,
or acts occurred in a fashion that supports the permissible inference.86 Finally, it
must weigh the likelihood that, despite limiting instruction, the jury will use the
evidence improperly (for the character inference) against the evidence’s probative
value when used only for its permissible (non-character) inference.87 It can then
admit the evidence only if the likelihood of impermissible use does not substan-
tially outweigh the likelihood of permissible use. By using evidence or argument
increasingly to contest the issue to which the evidence relates when used properly,
counsel increases the evidence’s probative value in concomitant degrees.88
Nonetheless, the analysis of probative value and prejudice hardly applies when
exclusion is justified—even in part—by evidentiary or constitutional policies
external to the factfinding process. The probative value of excluded evidence
increases when it rebuts an issue defense counsel raised, but if we did not base
exclusion entirely on relative lack of probativity, additional probativity alone
should not render it admissible. Consider, for example, Rule 408’s exclusion of
statements made in connection with settlement negotiations.89 The rule’s exclusion
is based partly on the external policy of encouraging settlements, a policy that does
not shift with the significance of the statements thus excluded.90 The rule once
85. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
86. See United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1998).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
88. For example, a defendant’s prior cocaine conviction may yield a permissible inference of knowledge of the
drug’s appearance without violating the proscription against using the conviction as character proof showing
action in conformity with a predisposition to drug possession. By not contesting familiarity with the drug’s
appearance, a defendant found with cocaine may succeed in keeping the conviction out. He may simply argue he
had no knowledge that, say, the bag containing the drug was in his possession. The judge may think using the
conviction to show the defendant knew of the bag (apart from knowing what it contained) is impermissible
character evidence, while using it merely to show that he would recognize the contents is permissible 404(b) proof
of knowledge. By focusing the defense on whether the defendant knew of the bag and essentially conceding that,
if he did, he knew its contents, counsel diminishes the evidence’s probative value for the permissible purpose.
Alternatively, counsel can contest whether the defendant knew what the bag contained by asserting in opening
statement that the prosecution will adduce no evidence that the defendant knew what cocaine looked like, eliciting
evidence from witnesses suggesting the defendant had reason to believe the substance was not cocaine, or arguing
on summation that the prosecution failed to show the defendant knew it was cocaine even if he saw it. By
contesting the issue on which the excluded evidence’s permissible inference is especially probative in any of these
ways, counsel has justified its admission if it were not otherwise justified. The increase in the evidence’s probative
value tilts the scale in favor of admissibility. Cf. United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 1070–73 (7th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (contrasting the defense theory
used at trial, that the drugs were not defendant’s, with the unused theory that the defendant did not know drugs
were involved, and finding that Rule 404(b)’s exception for absence of mistake applies if “I thought [the drugs]
were cough drops,” but not as in the present case where defendant argued “the drugs weren’t mine”).
89. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
90. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a) advisory committee’s note.
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allowed such statements to be admitted to show a party spoke inconsistently, but a
subsequent amendment extended the party’s immunity to encompass impeachment
use of such statements.91 The original decision to allow impeachment use, and the
subsequent decision to prohibit it, both reflect judgments about what is necessary
to encourage the free discussion that may result in settlement.92 The decisions first
to allow and then to prohibit impeachment use do not ultimately depend upon the
relative probative value of the statement if used as substantive evidence or
impeachment, but rather upon admission’s anticipated effect upon the end that
exclusion is designed to promote.93
The evidence from settlement negotiations might have been quite probative. But
it interferes with an important policy goal—encouraging settlements. Since the
evidence’s admission undermines that goal, no increase in its probative value alone
can determine admission. When courts decide such evidence is admissible because
counsel “opened the door,” they undermine this goal. Impeachment use of
statements made in settlement negotiations is now prohibited because a party’s
losing protection against such use by testifying would unduly discourage frank
discussions. That a statement confessing responsibility could hardly be more
probative—especially after the party testifies inconsistently—does not justify the
party’s surrendering immunity from the statement if admission unduly diminishes
the external goal. Rule 408 now conceives that even allowing impeachment use
would chill or deter desired settlement negotiations, requiring we forego whatever
benefit might flow to factfinding.94 In contrast, Rule 407 allows the use of
subsequent remedial measures to impeach a witness by inconsistent statement, but
not to impeach by contradiction except in limited circumstances.95 Allowing
impeachment by self-contradiction typically has minimal impact on a party’s
91. Rule 408 was recently amended to make statements made in the course of settlement negotiations
inadmissible “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or through contradiction.” See id.
92. See id.
The amendment prohibits the use of statements made in settlement negotiations when offered to
impeach by prior inconsistent statement or through contradiction. Such broad impeachment would
tend to swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the public policy of promoting
settlements. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE at 186 (5th ed. 1999) (“Use of statements made in
compromise negotiations to impeach the testimony of a party, which is not specifically treated in
Rule 408, is fraught with danger of misuse of the statements to prove liability, threatens frank
interchange of information during negotiations, and generally should not be permitted.”). See also
EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir. 1991) (letter sent as part of settlement
negotiation cannot be used to impeach defense witnesses by way of contradiction or prior
inconsistent statement; such broad impeachment would undermine the policy of encouraging
uninhibited settlement negotiations).
Id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. FED. R. EVID. 407. The substance of the testimony impeached by contradiction would have to fit one of the
other exceptions contained in the rule. See id. (“[T]he court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such
as . . . proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”).
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taking remedial measures because it may easily defend itself at trial without calling
the very person who took the measure to testify to something that taking the
measure contradicts. In contrast, allowing a party’s remedial measure to contradict
any of that party’s witnesses would effectively remove the rule’s immunity. To
Rule 407’s allowance of inconsistent statement impeachment and Rule 408’s
recent disallowance of it, one might also compare Rule 410, which has always
prohibited any impeachment use of statements made in plea negotiations.96 There,
the rule contemplates the threat of impeachment to have maximal impact on a
defendant’s willingness to discuss a plea because allowing the impeachment
compromises his ability to testify on his own behalf.97
Other limits on exclusionary rules promoting values besides factfinding accu-
racy similarly reflect the priority of the contextual effect of admission on the
desired goal. Rule 408, for instance, allows other uses, such as proving a witness’s
bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.98 Again, probative value alone
does not explain the permission to use settlement statements for those purposes.
We must look to the effect on the external goal.99 Using the statements to explain
the reason for delay or the means by which a party obstructed a criminal
investigation is thought not to adversely affect a party’s willingness to engage in
bona fide settlement talks.100 Eliminating the protection should create no disincen-
tive to engage in behavior the rule aims to encourage. By the same token, when
settlement or talks with one party affect the worth of his testimony against another,
96. FED. R. EVID. 410; see also 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 4:64 (3d ed. 2011) (“The legislative history of the original version of FED. R. EVID. 410 . . . made it plain that
FED. R. EVID. 410 entitled the accused to exclude plea bargaining statements, even if offered to impeach him after
he took the stand and testified inconsistently with what he said during plea bargaining.”). However, after the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995), which held waivers of the right to
exclude statements made during plea bargaining are enforceable, the issue of impeachment largely became moot.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra.
97. Cf. U.S. v. Udeagu, 110 F.R.D. 172, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding statements made by defendant during
his plea allocution could not be used to impeach his credibility after his guilty plea was withdrawn; the reason
behind 410 “is clear: the incriminatory admissions would make withdrawal of the plea nugatory since conviction
would almost surely result from a trial”).
98. FED. R. EVID. 408(b).
99. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (“This rule as reported makes evidence of settlement or
attempted settlement of a disputed claim inadmissible when offered as an admission of liability or the amount of
liability. The purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were
admissible.”).
100. See id. (“The final sentence of the rule serves to point out some limitations upon its applicability. Since the
rule excludes only when the purpose is proving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, an offer for
another purpose is not within the rule.”); see also id. (“[S]tatements made during compromise negotiations of
other disputed claims are not admissible in subsequent criminal litigation, when offered to prove liability for,
invalidity of, or amount of those claims. When private parties enter into compromise negotiations they cannot
protect against the subsequent use of statements in criminal cases by way of private ordering. The inability to
guarantee protection against subsequent use could lead to parties refusing to admit fault, even if by doing so they
could favorably settle the private matter. Such a chill on settlement negotiations would be contrary to the policy of
Rule 408.”).
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the desire to encourage bona fide settlements does not encompass ignoring the
possibility that a party may use dealings with one opposing party to “purchase”
favorable testimony against another.101 Again, the loss of protection by allowing a
settlement to show bias or prejudice of a witness discourages no settlements that
the rule seeks to promote.
Nonetheless, it seems especially tempting for courts to conceive that probative
value determines when they should remove protection against evidence sup-
pressed by the constitutional exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court describes the
scope of the exclusionary rule as the product of a balance between truthseeking
and deterrence.102 As counsel contests issues that accentuate the probative value of
the suppressed evidence and increase the cost of its exclusion to factfinding
accuracy, courts apparently expect the balance to tip in favor of admission. But that
is simply not so, at least not without further analysis of the effect of admission on
deterrence. Without further analysis, courts should see the balance can remain the
same or even tip further in favor of keeping the evidence out. Requiring counsel to
forgo making the argument or introducing the evidence to which the illegally-
obtained proof would be an especially probative rebuttal can only increase the
incentive to obtain it.
It is one thing to say general rules such as allowing suppressed evidence to
impeach defendants but not defense witnesses can be shaped by a balance between
truthseeking and deterrence; it is entirely another thing to say the opening the door
policy in individual cases should use the same balance to assure admission of
suppressed evidence when it is most probative. While balancing at the “wholesale”
level can properly inform the scope of the exclusionary mandate by suggesting a
rule that promises greater deterrence at lesser cost to the truth, further balancing at
the “retail” level to admit particularly probative evidence undermines the justifica-
tion for the rule originally selected. Once the prosecution can foresee benefitting
from obtaining evidence illegally when the proof is most needed in individual
cases, the incentive to obtain it rises along with its probative value. As the
comparison with federal rules excluding evidence for reasons external to factfind-
ing shows, only contextual circumstances besides probativity can elucidate the
effect that admission of excluded evidence will have on the external goal. When
the rule itself does not decide whether a particular use of the absence of excluded
evidence justifies its admission, the court first needs to consider the circumstances’
effects on the goal—here, deterrence—before allowing increased probativity to
justify its admission. When the purpose of exclusion is the pursuit of a policy
external to factfinding, opening the door is more complex than determining that the
defendant has chosen to contest a point that makes excluded evidence especially
probative. It is not enough to say the defendant might have refrained from
101. Id.
102. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1990).
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disputing the point, since the cost attached to doing so itself can undermine the
external goal. By using a standard for opening the door that promises the
prosecution use of suppressed evidence to deter or rebut defense evidence when
necessary, courts eliminate whatever deterrence was achieved from excluding the
evidence in the first place.
The problem of avoiding this complexity is manifest in a recent article
distinguishing between the doctrines of specific contradiction impeachment and
curative admissibility, both of which courts often refer to as species of the genus
“opening the door” to otherwise inadmissible evidence.103 According to Imwinkel-
ried and Gilligan, specific contradiction impeachment reflects a party’s right to
respond to an opponent’s evidence with his own rebuttal proof that can show the
opponent’s evidence is false or misleading.104 It is presumptively admissible,
subject only to factors that undermine its probativity.105 Its exclusion will thus be
rare, likely limited to situations where its admission confuses the issues or wastes
time.106 In contrast, curative admissibility reflects a party’s far more discretionary
right to introduce evidence countering an opponent’s introduction of evidence
inadmissible under evidence law, a doctrine courts sometimes call “fighting fire
with fire.”107 The ability to do so should rest on many factors inapplicable to
specific contradiction, such as whether the initial violation was intentional and thus
may potentially need to be deterred to prevent recurrence, and whether some
combination of less drastic steps, such as requiring objection to prevent admission
of the inadmissible evidence in the first place, striking the evidence after its
admission, and giving a curative instruction, can undo the damage without
allowing introduction of additional, inadmissible evidence.108 Notably, the authors
count the Supreme Court’s allowance of suppressed evidence to contradict a
defendant’s testimony as a primary example of specific contradiction.109 They
argue it shows “the probative worth of truly contradictory evidence is so great that
it can lift the bar of even a constitutional exclusionary rule,”110 and the “right to
103. Francis A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Bringing the “Opening the Door” Theory to a Close: The
Tendency to Overlook the Specific Contradiction Doctrine in Evidence Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 807 (2001).
104. Id. at 808 (“[R]ecognizing the entitlement to specific contradiction impeachment is essential to the proper
functioning of an effective adversary system of litigation . . . . [T]he entitlement is a corollary of the party’s
fundamental right in an adversary system to attack false or misleading unfavorable evidence presented by the
opponent.”).
105. Id. at 831–32 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).
106. Id. at 811 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 45 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999)).
107. Id. at 823–24 (citing Daniel P. Maguire, Curative Admissibility: Fighting Fire with Fire, 23 COLO. LAW.
2321 (1994)).
108. See id. at 825–29; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Clarifying the Curative Admissibility Doctrine:
Using the Principles of Forfeiture and Deterrence to Shape the Relief for an Opponent’s Evidentiary Misconduct,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (2007) (using principles of forfeiture and deterrence to redefine the curative
admissibility doctrine).
109. Gilligan & Imwinkelried, supra note 103, at 831 (discussing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627
(1980)).
110. Id.
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specifically contradict the opponent’s testimony is an essential entitlement” whose
disrespect imperils the functioning and integrity of the adversary process.111
Contrary to their claim, the probative value of suppressed evidence, however
enhanced by its contradiction of defense evidence or important to factfinding
accuracy, does not necessarily override the deterrence promoted by exclusion. The
same evidence the Supreme Court held admissible to specifically contradict a
defendant’s testimony, it has held inadmissible if offered to specifically contradict
any other witness besides the defendant because the resulting diminution in the
deterrent effect of exclusion would be intolerable.112 Indeed, the apparent assump-
tion that the integrity of the trial process entitled the prosecution in Johnson to
exclude, if it could not rebut, Johnson’s misidentification evidence, caused the
Court to prohibit the defense evidence erroneously.113 It failed to consider that
ruling’s impact on the deterrence of constitutional violations sought by the
Supreme Court’s exclusion of the evidence in the first instance. Since that
deterrence depends upon the courts not allowing possession of the illegally-
obtained evidence to require the defendant to refrain from taking advantage of its
absence to avoid suffering its admission, the error of the Johnson court is manifest.
It eliminates the deterrence James required by creating the very incentive to obtain
evidence illegally that James eliminated. However probative the suppressed
evidence may be in a particular case, its importance is inferior to the diminished
incentive effect the Court held intolerable if all defense evidence invited rebuttal
with suppressed evidence.
Since specific contradiction of much defense evidence alone does not justify
admitting suppressed proof, it easily follows that merely pointing out the absence
of suppressed evidence when urging the jury to conclude that the prosecution’s
evidence does not amount to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt should not
open the door. In circumstances such as those in Fregoso, for example, counsel
should be able to exploit the absence of physical evidence placing Fregoso at the
scene by factoring it into whether the government’s evidence proved Fregoso’s
involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. If the purpose of suppression is to deny
the government the benefit of its illegally-obtained evidence when making its case
for guilt, then we should hardly preclude counsel from urging the jury to do what
the rule says they should do, which is to consider the strength of the prosecution’s
case without the illegally-obtained evidence. Counsel’s argument in summation
111. Id. at 836.
112. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1990) (reversing the Illinois Supreme Court’s affirmance of
the defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor used “illegally obtained statements to impeach a defense
witness’ testimony”). Professor Daniel Capra suggested a felicitous analogy after reading a draft of this Article:
The exclusionary rule should be seen as a “Zen counterpart” of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), which admits the hearsay
statements of a person whom the defendant wrongfully prevented from testifying. Where FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)
admits evidence to deter misconduct despite the evidence’s unreliability, the exclusionary rule excludes evidence
to deter misconduct despite its reliability.
113. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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alone—“Did you notice that there was no evidence presented by the prosecution
connecting my client to [the] cornfield?”—should be perfectly proper.114 The
impact of the evidence’s absence on the jury’s decision defines the deterrent effect
of exclusion at trial, and since other goals require the jury to decide the case
without the benefit of the proof, it must be appropriate for counsel to point out its
absence. The alternative—to require the defendant to refrain from pointing out a
weakness in the prosecution’s case for guilt left by the absence of illegally-
obtained evidence, or to hold the door opened to the evidence in rebuttal—is to
eliminate the deterrence of unlawful conduct that the exclusionary rule seeks
unless the evidence is necessary to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal.
The unacceptability of the alternative is illustrated by Rogers v. State,115 in
which the trial court held defense counsel’s summation opened the door to the
defendant’s confession excluded because of a Miranda violation.116 Defense
counsel argued that “hard evidence” introduced at trial tended to show that Rogers’
testifying codefendants rather than Rogers murdered the victim, repeatedly lied to
police about it, and then falsely implicated Rogers at trial to minimize their
liability.117 He specifically highlighted their testimony that the murder weapon was
stolen from one of their neighbors, wrapped after the murder in one of their shirts,
and hidden in a place suggested by one of them, after which two others “used the
dead man’s money to buy drugs and rent a room.”118 Responding to the compara-
tive lack of “hard evidence” that Rogers—rather than his codefendants who
admitted much of their involvement—was the shooter, the prosecutor moved to
reopen his case to introduce the defendant’s taped confession in which he had
admitted to shooting the victim.119 Although recognizing it was going “out on a
limb,” the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce the confession.120
The appellate court reversed, noting the lack of precedent for admitting
illegally-obtained evidence to rebut statements made by an attorney in closing
argument, however misleading the prosecution claims them to be.121 More
importantly for present purposes, it wrote:
Even assuming that use of an impermissibly obtained confession is justified to
rebut improper argument by counsel, the facts of this case do not justify use of
the confession because the argument of counsel here was not improper. It was
the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
guilty. It was not Appellant’s burden to prove his innocence. A reasonable
114. People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
115. 844 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
116. Id. at 731–32.
117. Id. at 731.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 731–32.
121. Id. at 733.
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doubt might occur when evidence is lacking or when it is discredited.
Therefore, a defense lawyer’s duty during closing is to challenge the suffi-
ciency and credibility of the State’s proof. Counsel is free to argue these issues
using all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence. That is
all that was done here. We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in admitting
the confession.122
Thus, despite the prosecutor’s claim that “admission of the confession was
necessary to prevent [defense counsel] from misleading the jury by suppressing
the truth” and from making an “argument that he knew to be false in fact,” the
court held using the absence of evidence to challenge the state’s case was perfectly
appropriate.123 Indeed, such argument and its potential for “suppressing the truth”
was a contemplated consequence of exclusion:
Application of the exclusionary rule, for example, usually results in the
suppression of evidence, either physical or testimonial, that might disrupt the
truth-seeking objective of a jury trial. On balance, however, the courts have
reasoned that the suppression of truth is justified when important constitutional
rights are to be vindicated.124
The Fregoso trial and appeals courts’ suggestion that counsel either acted improp-
erly or opened the door to the suppressed proof merely by pointing out the absence
of physical evidence connecting Fregoso to the murder scene, therefore, cannot be
any more right than the court in Johnson.
C. The Inference That Suppressed Evidence Does Not Exist
The overly broad claim that exploiting the absence of suppressed evidence alone
opens the door masks a more subtle analysis of using suppression as a shield but
not a sword that may be influencing the courts. Defense counsel in Fregoso did not
just urge the jury to consider the absence of suppressed evidence. He asked it do so
after eliciting that the criminalist had collected plant material that prosecutors
potentially could match to defendant’s suppressed clothing, effectively suggesting,
in the absence of matching evidence, that none was found.125 The prosecution
initially had the criminalist testify generally to taking photographs and collecting
evidence at the scene, but did not specifically elicit that she had collected plant
122. Id. at 731–32.
123. Id. at 732.
124. Id.; see also United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the government’s claim that
allowing defendants to exclude inconsistent statements made in plea negotiations after testifying “prevents a
‘fraud on the court.’ That the Court is aware of facts which will be unknown to the jury is not significantly
different from the suppression on constitutional grounds of a defendant’s statements or other evidence. Indeed,
Rule[] . . . 410, . . . referred to in Mezzanatto as creating a privilege of the defendant, specifically contemplate[s]
that statements made by a defendant during plea discussions will be excluded at trial.”).
125. People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
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material and photographed footprints.126 Although the trial court warned defense
counsel against eliciting those facts, the prosecution recalled the criminalist and
elicited the plant material evidence, but not the footprints. Thus when counsel
argued the prosecution had produced no physical evidence, the jury likely
understood it as a claim that no connection to the cornfield had been found from
the plant material.127 While that claim was true enough, the similarity between the
sneakers and the footprints did constitute physical evidence that tended to place the
defendant at the scene. The court held it was “unfair for the defense to use the
clothing to argue Fregoso was not at the crime scene, when the shoes arguably did
link him to the scene.”128 The court might have reasoned that the jury, evaluating
evidence that investigators collected plant material but produced no matching
evidence at trial, would interpret counsel’s reference to the lack of physical
evidence to indicate that investigators failed to find any trace evidence for which
they would likely search, including footprints.129 In any event, it is sufficient to
focus on the court’s view that surely eliciting the footprints—one of which
matched the suppressed sneakers—opened the door to the sneakers. Otherwise,
admitting the footprints would surely mislead the jury into concluding that no
match for them was found.
On this view, the Fregoso court reacted to defense counsel’s exploiting the
evidence’s suppression to introduce the footprints and thereby suggest there was
affirmative proof the defendant had no matching sneakers, rather than merely
argue the significance of their not being produced at trial. If so, counsel took
improper advantage only at the point at which he took steps calculated to suggest
police found no physical evidence connecting the defendant to the scene rather
than merely to argue that the prosecution’s failure to produce it left a reasonable
doubt.
People v. Payne130 shows a court using a similar distinction to allow counsel to
argue the absence of suppressed evidence at trial, but not to suggest that the
evidence was not found. In Payne, the court held the defendant opened the door to
admission of a suppressed gun found in an apartment when he elicited evidence
that police had searched the apartment.131 Without waiting for summation, the
court admitted the gun seized in the illegal search to rebut the “false implication
that nothing connected with the robbery was recovered during the search.”132 The
court believed proof of the search coupled with the lack of evidence of its fruits
126. Id. at *15.
127. Id. at *16.
128. Id.
129. Alternatively, the trial judge simply may have thought it unfair selectively to introduce the exculpatory
plant material evidence and exclude the inculpatory footprint evidence, noting “because the clothes and shoes
were both suppressed, he could not ‘separate the clothing with the trace evidence . . . and the shoes . . . .’” Id.
130. 456 N.E.2d 44 (Ill. 1983).
131. Id. at 48–49.
132. Id. at 50.
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would potentially mislead the jury into finding the search had come up empty.133
Moreover, waiting for summation to see how counsel would use evidence of the
search apparently was not necessary because, considering its fruits were sup-
pressed, the fact it occurred was not relevant except to suggest nothing was
recovered.134
The Rogers court suggested a similar distinction. While holding defense
counsel’s argument about the lack of “hard evidence” showing that his client rather
than a codefendant was the shooter did not open the door to his client’s confession,
the court nonetheless wrote that defense counsel may open the door to suppressed
evidence if his “questions falsely suggest a lack of evidence that the lawyer knows
exists, but which was subject to pretrial suppression.”135 The analysis rested on the
primary distinction between exploiting suppression properly to “challenge the
sufficiency . . . of the State’s proof . . . using all reasonable inferences that might
be drawn from the evidence”136 and improperly to establish there was no such
evidence as was known to exist, but which had been suppressed.137 It also said
arguments and questions designed to suggest suppressed evidence had not been
found were improper, though the remedy for counsel’s merely suggesting that and
eliciting testimony to that effect would differ.138 The opinion noted courts can deal
with improper argument and questions by sustaining objections and, ultimately,
reminding counsel of ethics rules.139 But “[w]hen a lawyer questions a witness, the
answer is evidence,”140 whose impact on the jury might be counteracted only by
admitting the suppressed proof.
However appealing and, perhaps, necessary it may be to distinguish between
asserting suppressed evidence does not exist and merely arguing the significance
of its absence at trial, there is no basis for finding the former gives defendants an
unfair evidentiary advantage by allowing the jury to decide based on a false fact.
Although the distinction between the “absence of evidence” and “evidence of
absence” is critical to good science,141 it is largely irrelevant to legal factfinding
when the prosecution bears the burden of proof and the defendant, who has no
obligation to produce evidence, seeks to capitalize on the prosecution’s failure to
produce it. The structure of a criminal trial places the burden of producing
evidence on the prosecution, and we ask the jury to make a decision based on the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728, 733 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
136. Id. at 733.
137. Id. at 733 n.4.
138. Id. at 732 n.3.
139. Id. (“Standard jury instructions caution juries that closing arguments do not constitute evidence. Ethics
rules prohibit lawyers from making improper arguments, and trial judges have the power to prevent improper
argument by granting timely objections.”).
140. Id. at 733 n.4.
141. Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” in The Fine Art of
Baloney Detection, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 201, 213 (1996).
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presence or absence of evidence actually produced at trial.142 From their perspec-
tive, there is little difference between deciding a case based on the absence of
evidence produced at trial and the absence of evidence found outside the court-
room in an illegal search. The significance of the missing evidence depends far
more upon the jury’s expectation of its production if the proposition the prosecu-
tion seeks to prove is true.143 In turn, that expectation depends upon numerous
factors that dwarf whether the jury concluded authorities did not find it, or simply
decided the case without ever considering the reason for its absence. Of critical
importance is what all the other evidence in the case along with common
experience suggests about the probability the evidence would exist if the defendant
were guilty and that the prosecution can find and produce it if it did exist.
Explaining why the prosecution did not produce the proof defeats the purpose of
exclusion and so evidence of the suppression obviously cannot be admitted to
explain its absence. Without an explanation for its non-production, we expect the
jury to assess the significance of the evidence’s absence for the strength of the
prosecution’s case without speculating about the existence of a legal impediment
to its production that changes its probative worth. So we ask them to consider the
evidence before them as a closed universe, which effectively asks them to decide
as if all the evidence available to them is all they discovered during the
investigation, or, at least, all upon which they can legitimately rely. Assessing the
strength of the evidence that is lacking, they may consider that any evidence not
before them does not exist outside the courtroom (why else would the prosecution
not offer it?) or, perhaps, even that the prosecution failed to pursue it. Both of those
explanations are, of course, untrue if one credits the prosecution witnesses
testifying to the illegal search and its fruits, but they do not exact a factfinding cost
that is unfair from the perspective of what we ask a jury to do.
We ask a jury to decide whether reasonable doubt remains by assessing the
significance of missing evidence for the strength of the prosecution’s case, a
process that may require them to consider possible reasons for its absence. If they
do not speculate about a reason for its non-production that is unrelated to its
probative worth within the closed universe of evidence they have heard, they are
doing exactly what we ask them to do. Assuming some legal impediment such as
an illegal search exists, and then considering that impediment to diminish the
significance of the evidence’s absence within the context of all the proof, is exactly
what we do not want the jury to do. So even if the jury should consider the absence
142. Science makes for a useful comparison. Where neither proponent of conflicting views about a scientific
hypothesis bears the burden of proof, the absence of evidence about it is neutral. Id. at 210–11. In law, the absence
of evidence weighs against the party who bears the burden of proof.
143. On the importance of juror expectations, see, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188–89
(1997); Stephen A. Salzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the
Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978). On the dependence of evidence’s probative value upon
the presence or absence of other evidence, see RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES
142 (5th ed. 2011).
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of physical evidence a consequence of a search that came up empty or an
inadequate investigation, they are still properly assessing its significance for the
strength of the prosecution’s case. What really matters most is that they do not
speculate about its absence for reasons besides those relevant to their job—to reach
a conclusion about the strength of the closed universe of proof before them.144
From the perspective of probativity, that the evidence “merely” does not exist at
trial for the jury to consider is not significantly different from the evidence’s not
having been discovered outside the courtroom. Either way, the prosecution’s case
needs to be judged without it.
Moreover, as the discussion of opening the door to admission of evidence
excluded for factfinding accuracy shows, counsel hardly needs to suggest that
absent evidence does not exist to make it particularly probative. The suggestion the
prosecution’s case fails to eliminate a reasonable doubt that remains because of the
absence of the evidence is more than sufficient.145 So avoidance of an unfair
evidentiary advantage does not justify this attempt to distinguish between the use
of the exclusionary rule as a mere shield and as a sword. Far more important to the
significance of the excluded evidence is how its relationship to other proof affects
the jury’s expectation that the evidence would exist and the prosecution can
produce it if the defendant were guilty, despite whether counsel is trying to
establish it does not exist at all or “merely” that its absence at trial matters. To the
defendant, who has no burden, it is far more important to establish the importance
of the missing evidence than to establish why it is missing, as long as the jury does
not speculate about a reason for its absence that is unrelated to the strength of the
prosecution’s case.146
Moreover, the two forms of persuasion ultimately cannot help but overlap.
When counsel urges the particular significance of the evidence’s absence in the
context of the proof, she heightens the jury’s expectation that they would produce
the evidence if the defendant were guilty. Doing so thus makes it more likely the
jury will consider its non-production a sign it does not exist or that the prosecution
failed to pursue it. Consider Payne. The court believed that proving the search
occurred unfairly allowed the defense to “affirmatively misrepresent or falsely
imply that the police found no physical evidence connected with the robbery
during their search” rather than merely to “argue the lack of corroboration of the
identifications or point out that the State’s case depended almost entirely upon the
144. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585,
619–23 (2011) (deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule depends upon jurors’ not inferring from gaps in the
prosecution’s proof that probative evidence was excluded, and then relying upon the existence of that
extrajudicial proof, consciously or unconsciously, when evaluating the prosecution’s case).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 85–88.
146. Cf. Jacobi, supra note 144, at 630–33 (noting if the jury were to fill “natural holes” in the prosecutor’s
case by speculating about whether probative evidence was found and suppressed, and if that speculation affects its
evaluation of the prosecution’s case, deterrence would require courts to allow defense counsel to use the absence
of suppressed evidence at trial as proof that it does not exist.).
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reliability of the identification testimony.”147 But it immediately and (presumably)
unwittingly revealed how slippery that distinction could be when it noted “[t]he
problem in this case arose . . . from cross-examination and potential argument by
the defense which falsely implied the absence of physical evidence connecting
defendants with the crimes.”148 The ambiguity in the sentence between the absence
of physical evidence introduced at trial or discovered during the search is telling.
To argue the lack of corroboration, defense counsel obviously had to argue (at a
minimum) the absence of physical evidence produced at trial connecting Payne to
the crime. But to argue its significance, he also had to ask the jury to consider that it
should exist and be produced if they adequately proved the identification.
That the police searched the apartment where they arrested the defendant the
same day as the robbery surely increased the likelihood that corroborating
evidence would be produced if it existed, and with it the likelihood the jury would
conclude from its non-production that it was not found. Nevertheless, evidence the
defendant carried a weapon, made off with proceeds of the robbery, and was
arrested in the apartment shortly after the robbery alone, without mention of the
search at all, also increased the likelihood that corroborating evidence should be
found and produced. Those facts magnify the significance of corroborating
evidence’s absence while unavoidably increasing the likelihood that the jury
would falsely conclude they produced none because none was found.149 Yet the
false explanation for the gap in the proof does not meaningfully increase its
significance, conferring no unfair evidentiary advantage.
While factfinding does not suffer when counsel’s highlighting the significance
of suppressed evidence unavoidably suggests it was not found, deterrence clearly
does when courts use that circumstance to justify admitting illegally obtained
evidence. Counsel, anxious to avoid opening the door, is deterred from establish-
ing the significance of absent evidence because, by doing so, he also suggests it
does not exist.150 Just as evidence of a search without its fruits (as in Payne)
147. Payne, 456 N.E.2d at 46–47.
148. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
149. Alternatively, the jury might consider that the prosecution failed to search for the evidence. But the
significance of the gap in the proof would not differ materially. A rational jury considering the significance of
missing evidence that it expected the prosecution to produce should not consider failure to search any more
favorably for the prosecution by speculating that the evidence, though not produced, might yet exist. Apparently,
the prosecution in Fregoso did not think so; while the court was concerned eliciting the plant material would
create the impression that no incriminating physical evidence was found, the prosecution, at least at one point,
complained that counsel’s eliciting the plant material without the footprints would “‘set[] up’ a failure to
investigate argument.” People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
150. The Court has frequently explained exceptions to the exclusionary rule at trial undermine the rule’s
deterrent effect when they “chill” defendants “from calling witnesses who would otherwise offer probative
evidence” or “from presenting their best defense and sometimes any defense at all” because “[w]henever police
obtained evidence illegally, defendants would have to assess prior to trial the likelihood that the evidence would
be admitted.” See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314–16 (1990). An exception that is too broad or whose
application is too uncertain engenders that effect. Id. at 315–16 (rejecting possibilities of only allowing
impeachment of defense testimony “purposely presented” by defense counsel or in “direct conflict” with
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suggested nothing was found, so does any proof or argument increasing the
significance of potential evidence whose absence is unexplained suggest it does
not exist. For example, if there were testimony the victim saw the perpetrator enter
the apartment carrying weapons shortly before his arrest, the failure to produce
weapons to corroborate the victim’s identification of Payne as the perpetrator
would be significant in a way it would not be without the testimony. If the
defendant elicited the testimony, would it, like the search, open the door to the
suppressed evidence because the testimony also “falsely impl[ied] that the police
found no [weapons]?”151 That is essentially what Fregoso held when it decided
evidence of the footprints justified introduction of the suppressed sneakers.152 If
the prosecution elicited the weapons testimony, would the defendant still open the
door by arguing reasonable doubt because the prosecution did not produce the
weapons that its evidence suggests it can produce if the identification were
accurate? Fregoso supports that result too. If counsel’s introducing the evidence or
making the argument in these scenarios opens the door, what is left of the Rogers
court’s holding that counsel can urge the jury to consider the sufficiency of the
State’s proof “using all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the
evidence”?153
The overlap between counsel’s making effective use of the suppressed evi-
dence’s absence at trial and effectively suggesting it was not found means counsel
legitimately doing the former will always run the risk of opening the door to the
suppressed proof. This risk increases proportionately as defense counsel succeeds
in highlighting the significance of the absent evidence in the context of the case.
Meanwhile, the consequences of opening the door are dramatic. Admission of the
suppressed evidence not only corrects the impression that suppressed evidence
was not found; it establishes defense counsel as, at best, a thoroughly unreliable
analyst of the strength of the prosecution’s case or, at worst, a manipulator guilty of
having deliberately misled the jury. The combination of uncertainty about a court’s
finding that counsel has opened the door and its Draconian consequence sends a
powerful message.
To risk-averse defense counsel, avoiding opening the door is critical because
doing so is an avoidable blunder fatal to the defendant’s chances of acquittal. If
factfinding were the only issue, that result would be unproblematic, but deterrence
is the critical metric, and counsel’s compulsion to take all steps necessary to
prevent opening the door greatly diminishes it. To avoid any possibility of opening
suppressed evidence because the “inherent subjectivity” and “ex ante uncertainty” of the tests will “chill
defendants’ presentation of potential witnesses.”). The chilling effect is certain to occur if courts hold counsel’s
exploiting the absence of suppressed evidence opens the door to its admission whenever the jury might infer from
the importance of the missing evidence that it must not have been found because effective exploitation will always
highlight the importance of the missing proof.
151. Payne, 456 N.E.2d at 47.
152. Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16–17; see supra text accompanying note 128.
153. Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728, 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).
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the door, counsel would have to allow the prosecution to determine the conse-
quence of suppression by selectively introducing evidence to minimize the
significance of the missing proof by, for example, omitting testimony that would
lead the jury to expect suppressed corroborating evidence. Introducing evidence or
making an argument that specifically called the jury’s attention to facts leading
them to expect the suppressed evidence would inevitably risk opening the door by
suggesting that the absent evidence does not exist. The result would be similar to
when a defendant waives his immunity against the use of plea discussions by
allowing the prosecution to use his statements “to rebut any evidence or arguments
offered by or on behalf of [the defendant].”154 As a court interpreting such a
waiver155 observed, the provisions require counsel who wishes to avoid opening
the door only to “argue reasonable doubt” because the government’s witnesses
“should not be believed,” while prohibiting him from asserting “any affirmative
theory of factual innocence” such as whether the charged crime occurred or
whether the defendant committed it.156
Once counsel attempts to establish the proof is consistent with the defendant’s
factual innocence, as, for example, when the absence of expected corroborating
evidence challenges the victim’s identification of Payne or Fregoso’s presence at
the crime scene, he crosses the line between capitalizing on suppression to shield
his client from the illegally-obtained evidence and using the evidence’s absence to
establish a contradictory theory of events based on a false fact, opening the door to
the suppressed proof. Allowing the prosecution to use its illegally-obtained proof
to eliminate the defendant’s ability to advance a theory of factual innocence157 thus
confers a substantial benefit. At the very least, it confers a benefit that the Court’s
holding merely that suppressed evidence is inadmissible on the prosecution’s
case-in-chief does not contemplate. It is a long way from not considering the
evidence when deciding the prosecution’s affirmative case is sufficient to survive a
motion for judgment of acquittal to allowing the evidence to prevent the defendant
from developing any theory of factual innocence rebutted by the illegally-obtained
evidence. In that distance, there is much room for the prosecution to realize that
obtaining evidence illegally, while forgoing the opportunity to use it to survive a
motion for judgment of acquittal, nonetheless makes the difference between a
154. See United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004).
155. See United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190. Defense counsel would be hamstrung even though the waiver in Duffy was
arguably narrower than that in Velez because the former allowed rebuttal of “factual assertions” while the latter
also permitted rebuttal of counsel’s “arguments.” Compare Duffy,133 F. Supp. 2d at 214, with Velez, 354 F.3d at
192.
156. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
157. Advancing a theory of factual innocence includes suggesting an innocent factual scenario the prosecu-
tion’s proof does not disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore equivalent to advancing a theory of
factual inadequacy enabled by the absence of the excluded evidence. That is precisely the reason why the
prosecution—when it can—demands permission to use excluded evidence to rebut defense counsel’s statements
even though they do not constitute evidence. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
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merely possible and certain conviction. That very possibility moved the James158
Court to prohibit the general use of suppressed evidence for rebuttal, reasoning its
contribution to factfinding accuracy could not justify the diminished deterrence
resulting from its admission.159
Moreover, to the extent there is precedent, there is every reason for defense
counsel to expect that highlighting the significance of the missing proof by
establishing that its absence allows for an innocent factual scenario that the
prosecution has not disproved would not automatically open the door. Just as the
suggestion that nothing was found when Payne was arrested cast doubt on the
victim’s identification, the evidence that the defendant in James had changed his
appearance before the crime cast doubt on his. But James’ evidence did not open
the door because using his confession to deter or rebut any exculpatory evidence
besides his own testimony attached too extensive a reward for obtaining evidence
illegally. We can hardly fault counsel for thinking any attempt to establish a theory
of factual innocence, with evidence elicited from witnesses besides the defendant
and ordinarily appropriate argument, would not open the door to the suppressed
evidence. After all, if defense counsel can call a witness to testify Payne arrived at
the apartment empty-handed without risking rebuttal, why—from the perspective
of a jury’s finding false facts—should eliciting there was a search open the door? If
counsel can call a witness to testify that Fregoso was not at the crime scene without
risking rebuttal, why should eliciting what investigators collected at the scene—to
educate jurors about the kind of proof the prosecution might have produced to
place him at the scene, but did not—open the door? So less risk-averse counsel
may try it, but if the cases are any guide, they will do so with disastrous
consequences certain to dissuade them, and others, from repeating the mistake.
D. When Defendants Waive Protection Against Suppressed Proof
Except for using suppressed evidence to impeach a testifying defendant, the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule requires defense counsel be allowed to
elicit evidence and make arguments contradicted by suppressed evidence without
158. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319 (1990) (declining to allow impeachment of witnesses besides the
defendant with suppressed evidence because “expanding the exception to encompass the testimony of all defense
witnesses would not further the truth-seeking value with equal force but would appreciably undermine the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule”).
159. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. at 319 (“[M]uch if not most of the time, police officers confront opportunities
to obtain evidence illegally after they have already legally obtained (or know that they have other means of legally
obtaining) sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case. In these situations, a rule requiring exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence from only the government’s case in chief would leave officers with little to lose and
much to gain by overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering. Narrowing the exclusionary rule in this
manner, therefore, would significantly undermine the rule’s ability ‘to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). So long as we are committed to protecting the people from the disregard of their
constitutional rights during the course of criminal investigations, inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence
must remain the rule, not the exception.”).
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fear of opening the door.160 This permission must encompass the ability to exploit
all factual inferences available because of the absence of the suppressed proof,
even though a consequence may be to allow the jury to conclude the suppressed
evidence must not exist. That does not mean, however, there is no limit on the
defendant’s legitimate exploitation of the exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence,
just that it cannot be justified by focusing on the probative value of suppressed
evidence while turning a blind eye to deterrence when exclusion seems to pinch
the most. This Section argues courts fairly require defendants to waive their
protection against suppressed evidence when they seek to use evidence enabled by
the violation about which they complain. That encompasses circumstances where
they seek to introduce proof of an unlawful search or interrogation (including any
resulting evidence) or when they ask the jury to consider why the suppressed
evidence is absent at trial—for example, because the prosecution failed to pursue
or to find it. In each of these cases, the defendant chooses to open a subject—the
existence of the unlawful investigatory step, its product or the reason for the
evidence’s absence—closed for his benefit, and attempts to use suppression to
make himself better off than he would have been absent the illegality.161
The circumstances under which defendants would waive their protection are far
narrower than all the occasions upon which defense arguments or evidence will
mislead in the absence of suppressed evidence, preserving deterrence even when
counsel’s emphasis on the importance of missing evidence might lead the jury to
conclude that it does not exist. Simultaneously, however, it prevents counsel from
exploiting evidence to whose acquisition he objects without waiving that objec-
tion.162 It also prevents him from proffering an explanation for the evidence’s
absence enabled only by the need to prevent the prosecution from offering its
explanation, with the effect of undermining suppression’s goal.163 The circum-
stances are narrower because they focus not on factfinding accuracy, but rather on
the non-factfinding reasons for exclusion, and hold the door is opened when those
160. This result is required by James’s injunction to prevent the prosecution from using illegally-obtained
evidence to deter defenses (James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1990)), a goal that requires jurors—if they are
to speculate about why evidence was not produced—to equate the absence of evidence with its nonexistence
rather than to infer that it was found and excluded. Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary
Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 630–33 (2011).
161. The argument of this Part is similar to that applied by Richard L. Marcus to waiving the attorney-client
privilege in The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605 (1986). Professor Marcus
argues one can explain waivers of the attorney-client privilege only by recognizing that courts sometimes err by
relying on “the unfairness of having a privilege, rather than the unfairness of the act relied upon, to show a
waiver.” Id. at 1630. The argument aptly captures some courts’ misuse of truthseeking to hold that defendants
open the door to suppressed evidence by making it particularly probative. Although Marcus is skeptical of “using
the purposes of the privilege to decide waiver issues,” and would have courts shift focus from “purposes of the
privilege to purposes for waiver—to protect against unfairness,” his argument acknowledges that it is critical to
prevent courts from defining unfairness to undermine the purpose of excluding the evidence in the first place. Id.
at 1619, 1627. To that extent, the purpose of the privilege is paramount.
162. Cf. id. at 1627–28 (selective disclosure of material covered by attorney-client privilege justifies waiver).
163. See infra note 169.
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reasons do not require continuing the defendant’s immunity.164
The exclusionary rule creates an immunity from evidence obtained by violating
defendants’ rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and pressure to
make involuntary or uncounseled statements.165 Defendants may, of course, waive
their rights to have their case adjudicated without illegally-obtained evidence by
choosing not to challenge investigators’ actions.166 By introducing evidence
obtained illegally, the defendants should also waive their rights to exclude other
evidence obtained in the same unlawful search, seizure, or interrogation as that
which yielded the evidence they introduce. It does not advance the goal of
protecting affected defendants from the consequences of those constitutional
violations if they are not so much objecting to the violation of their rights as trying
to take strategic advantage of it with evidence they would not otherwise have.
While they undoubtedly would prefer to take advantage of suppression to use any
exculpatory proof gathered illegally while excluding the inculpatory proof, there is
no justification for allowing them to do so.
First, the underlying constitutional protections themselves address the authori-
ties’ actions, not the affected party’s right to avoid only incriminating evidence
gathered thereby.167 A defendant insisting in good faith on protection from the
consequences of authorities’ illegality is hard pressed to claim that he is entitled to
exploit those consequences selectively. Second, although one might imagine
allowing defendants to make selective use of suppressed evidence imposes a
penalty deterring violations even further, there is no reason to believe doing so is
necessary. The police deciding whether to take the challenged investigatory
measure undoubtedly anticipate that it will produce incriminating evidence. It is
unlikely the decision to do so will be deterred by the prospect that, besides losing
the anticipated inculpatory evidence, the prosecution may have to suffer some
exculpatory evidence obtained during the same search, seizure or interrogation
that can be rebutted only by inculpatory, but suppressed, evidence. The requisite
164. Cf. Marcus, supra note 161, at 1629–30 (waiver of attorney-client privilege should depend on whether
privilege-holder seeks to make selective use of privileged material, not on whether he “raise[s] certain legal or
factual issues” justifying loss of the privilege as the “price” of doing so). Marcus uses Judge Learned Hand’s
distinction between application of an evidentiary privilege legitimately to “suppress” or improperly to “garble”
the truth to help explain the unfairness of selectively using excluded evidence. Id. at 1627 (citing United States v.
St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942)). While helpful, the distinction is hardly self-evident in various
contexts and cannot fully justify an “Opening the Door” policy, which ultimately depends on whether the reasons
for excluding particular types of evidence justify either consequence for the truth. See infra notes 167, 173 and
accompanying text.
165. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
166. We do not prevent a defendant from electing not to challenge an unlawful search or interrogation to
preserve exclusion’s deterrent effect on future violations.
167. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI. The Court has rejected the argument that deterring government
misconduct requires imposing penalties beyond eliminating benefits from obtaining the proof when their prospect
is likely to affect investigators’ future conduct. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (suppression
unjustified when the likelihood that admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence would encourage police
misconduct is but a “speculative possibility.”).
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deterrence is adequately achieved by making the defendant no worse off for the
government’s having obtained evidence illegally that is inadmissible on its
case-in-chief or, under the circumstances, as rebuttal. It does not require selective
use of the tainted evidence that, by making the defendant better off than he would
have been without the government illegality, amounts to a windfall.168
Recasting opening the door as a question of waiving one’s protection by seeking
advantage enabled by the government’s illegality offers a different perspective on
the cases. First, waiving protection against suppressed evidence depends upon
whether the evidence the defendant offers was obtained by the same illegal means
to which the defendant objects, not whether it is contradicted by the suppressed
evidence or creates an inference allowing the jury to conclude that it does not exist.
Fregoso provides an example. Before the court allowed the prosecution to use
Fregoso’s suppressed clothing to show an inculpatory footprint in response to
counsel’s pointing out the absence of physical evidence placing Fregoso at the
scene, it responded to his attempt partially to withdraw his suppression motion.
Counsel sought to use the suppressed clothing to show it was free of plant material
while nonetheless prohibiting the prosecution from using the sneakers to show the
matching footprint.169 Counsel later tried to use the sneakers to show they did not
match some footprints, while preventing the prosecution from using the sneakers
to show the match with other footprints.170 Neither of these uses would be allowed
under a waiver rule that requires the defendant to object to a search or suffer all
evidence it produced. At one point, the court found its way to a similar conclusion
when it finally explained the defendant could not introduce the clothing without
the sneakers because they were “both suppressed,”171 though the linchpin of
waiver is not that they were both suppressed, but that they were discovered during
the same unlawful search.
If they had seized the inculpatory sneakers in one unlawful search and the other
clothing in another, there is no reason the defendant’s choice to introduce the
exculpatory clothing should prevent him from challenging the separate, unlawful
search revealing the sneakers. Using probativity as a guide, however, the court
struggled to explain why the defendant could not selectively introduce the clothing
to establish the lack of plant material evidence, while nonetheless excluding the
inculpatory footprints, finally suggesting that introducing the exculpatory evi-
dence without the rebuttal was simply misleading.172 But that rationale is far too
168. A similar result flows from a conception of the exclusionary rule as primarily concerned with restoring the
status quo ante before the violation rather than deterring future violations. See Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary
Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (1998) (noting the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to put the state and the accused in the positions they would have been had the Constitution not
been violated—neither better nor worse).
169. See People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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broad; it cannot explain the doctrine that clearly permits the defendant to do
exactly that if they obtained the exculpatory clothing lawfully while they obtained
the inculpatory sneakers illegally.173 The waiver rule, however, asks whether the
defendant chooses to use evidence enabled by the unlawful search of which he
complains. The Fregoso court decided that issue correctly. Since the clothing and
sneakers were part of the same unlawful search, the defendant could not both
complain of the violation and capitalize on it. But the proper rationale is not rooted
in the probative value of the suppressed evidence considered against the defense
the defendant advanced, or else we would admit it despite whether the defendant
used evidence from the same, or a different, search to make his defense.174
Similarly, Payne was subjected to a lawful search upon arrest that yielded nothing
right before the illegal apartment search that produced the gun.175 Had he offered
evidence that the search of his person came up empty, he would not have waived
his right to suppress the gun seized in the illegal apartment search.
Payne also presents the scenario of indirect proof of a search’s result that merits
similar analysis. Defense counsel refrained from directly eliciting evidence of
what was seized, eliciting only that police had conducted a search. When linked to
the prosecution’s failure to produce any seized evidence, proof of the search
created the inference that nothing was found. Indeed, since counsel did not seek to
elicit anything they had seized, proof that authorities conducted a search had no
relevance besides indirectly proving it came up empty. Consequently, the evidence
amounted to proof of the search’s results, justifying waiver as if counsel had
directly elicited evidence that nothing was found in the search or selectively
introduced some seized items. Moreover, the prohibition on mentioning the search
works both ways. The prosecution’s eliciting the search but not its outcome—
daring the defendant to ask about what was found—is improper.176 In this
scenario, the relevance of the search is dependent upon the jury’s inferring police
found something incriminating that the prosecution cannot elicit and of which the
defendant would rather have the jury be unaware. Courts need to prevent this and
other indirect efforts to prove something incriminating was found, just as they
need to prevent indirect efforts by defendants to prove that nothing incriminating
was found. The way to do that is to prevent both sides from eliciting proof that the
173. This is a necessary consequence of the holding in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990), that deterrence
requires defense evidence besides the defendant’s testimony to be immune from rebuttal with illegally-obtained
evidence, however misleading the former may be in the absence of the latter. See supra text accompanying notes
27–30.
174. Nor is this result easily explained by the distinction between consequences of excluding evidence that
merely “suppress” rather than “garble” the truth. See supra note 164.
175. People v. Payne, 456 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ill. 1983). Payne’s search was initially considered lawful because the
trial court found probable cause to arrest, but it suppressed the weapons found in the refrigerator because they
were not in an area within Payne’s immediate control. Id.
176. See United States ex rel. Castillo v. Fay, 350 F.2d 400, 402–03 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding improper, but not
constitutionally prohibited, for prosecution to elicit the search of defendant’s apartment and say that “something”
(but not what) was found, implying that incriminating evidence had been suppressed).
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illegal investigatory step occurred at all.
The waiver rule also explains why the court’s holding in Payne preventing the
defendant from “affirmatively misrepresent[ing] or falsely imply[ing] that the
police found no physical evidence connected with the robbery during their
search”177 should provide no support for courts, such as that in Johnson, finding
counsel opens the door whenever she introduces evidence or makes an argument
contradicted by suppressed evidence. The Payne court was careful to note the
defendant could use the absence of physical evidence to “argue the lack of
corroboration of the identifications” and “allowing the defense or prosecution to
misrepresent to the jury the actual facts of the case is neither consistent with the
proper functioning and continued integrity of the judicial system nor with the
policies of the exclusionary rules.”178 Considering the policies underlying the
exclusionary rule, the court’s reference to the “actual facts” misrepresented was to
counsel’s establishing that no evidence was found in the search rather than to his
arguing inferences from the absence of the evidence for the strength of the
prosecution’s case. If the defendant wants to prove investigators found no
incriminating items or to ask the jury so to conclude, he is free to do so,
understanding he has waived his immunity to the prosecution’s proof of what
police actually discovered during the illegal search. Allowing him to do so without
waiving his immunity is not necessary to achieve the purpose of the exclusionary
rule, while arguing all the inferences from the absence of the evidence is. The
“actual facts of the case” about whose misrepresentation Payne was concerned,179
therefore, are those surrounding the illegal investigatory measure whose assertion
is unnecessary to accomplish exclusion’s purpose, not to the “actual facts”
concerning the crime.
The waiver rule preserves the requisite deterrence that flows from the evidence’s
suppression in this circumstance as well. Prohibiting proof of the unlawful
investigation amounts to prohibiting any explanation for why suppressed evidence
is absent that implicates the existence of the investigation. We prohibit the
prosecution’s explanation for the obvious reason that allowing it would completely
undermine deterrence. Meanwhile, meaningful deterrence depends upon the
defendant’s ability to expose weaknesses in the prosecution’s case by exploiting
the absence of suppressed evidence, including arguing why they should produce it
to eliminate reasonable doubt. Allowing the defense to do so requires a test for
opening the door that will not deter them from introducing evidence or making
arguments suggesting innocent factual scenarios that the prosecution’s lawfully-
obtained evidence does not disprove. Allowing the defendant to suggest reasons
why the prosecution failed to produce the evidence, however, is not necessary to
177. Payne, 456 N.E.2d at 47.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id.
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do that effectively, while arguing the significance of its absence is. Closing off the
prosecution’s ability to raise this subject is necessary to create the desired
deterrence and inures to the benefit of the defendant. There is no reason to allow
the defendant to raise that issue, typically by asserting not only that the prosecution
failed to produce evidence at trial, but the jury should thereby infer that it does not
exist, without presumptively allowing the prosecution to respond. The deterrent
effect does not depend upon an explanation for the evidence’s absence; indeed the
ideal deliberation omits speculation about any reason for its absence that does not
bear on the ability of the prosecution’s case to eliminate reasonable doubts.
Consequently, the defendant should be able to introduce evidence and make
arguments about the importance of the missing evidence, even when its impor-
tance might lead a jury to think its non-existence must explain its absence—the
prosecution having failed to find it. Nevertheless, the defendant cannot ask the jury
to draw that inference directly or indirectly without opening the door.180 This
requires little sacrifice of the defendant who can make his point without asking the
jury to speculate about reasons for its absence unrelated to the prosecution’s case
as we ask them to judge it. Meanwhile, prohibiting the defendant from offering his
unrebutted explanation for the evidence’s absence prevents him from taking
unnecessary advantage of suppression. From the perspective of factfinding accu-
racy, the absence of suppressed evidence at trial and proof of its non-existence
elide as argument or evidence showing the importance of missing proof increas-
ingly suggests the prosecution must have failed to produce it because they did not
find it. Yet from the perspective of whether the defendant should waive his
protection by asking the jury to consider why they did not produce the evidence, all
depends upon whether the defendant confined himself to arguing inferences from
the absence of the proof. Although this allows the possibility the jury will imply
from its importance that the absent evidence was not found, the point is not
whether they are mislead to that conclusion by the absence of suppressed evidence.
That possibility always exists—and is tolerated—whenever we exclude evidence
for reasons besides factfinding accuracy. The question is whether the defendant
waives his protection against the explanation for the suppressed evidence’s
absence by himself interjecting this unnecessary issue.181
180. Again, this result is not explained by the distinction between consequences of excluding evidence that
merely “suppress” rather than “garble” the truth. See supra note 164.
181. By asking the jury to conclude that no proof was found, the defendant asks it to find a fact whose support
is enabled only by the evidence’s suppression, making it roughly equivalent to selectively using evidence
produced by government illegality. Similar examples include instances in which a defendant, rather than avoid
mentioning a suppressed interrogation, introduces evidence of what he told the police during the interrogation.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 n.11 (1976) (prosecution may use defendant’s post-Miranda silence if the
defendant claimed “to have told the police the same version upon arrest [as that offered at trial],” even though
such silence would otherwise be inadmissible to impeach the defendant’s testimony); Groshart v. United States,
392 F.2d 172, 178 n.4 (9th Cir. 1968) (implying in dicta even the prohibition on impeachment use of illegal
statements yields “where the defendant’s testimony puts in issue the very question of what he told the police”)
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Consequently, while Fregoso should not introduce the exculpatory plant mate-
rial tests made with his suppressed clothing without waiving his right to object to
the inculpatory footprint analysis developed with evidence obtained in the same
unlawful search, he should be able to prove what the criminalist collected at the
scene to make concrete the significance of the absence of trace evidence. Showing
police collected footprints and plant material at the scene, and then pointing out the
prosecution produced no evidence connecting the trace evidence to the defendant,
was proper. The defendant did not use evidence produced by the unlawful seizure
of his clothing nor argue investigators failed to find evidence connecting him to the
collected material. When he introduces evidence the police found nothing connect-
ing him to the material or asks the jury so to conclude, however, he opens the door.
The waiver rule promises a clearer standard by which courts can decide and
counsel can anticipate when defense evidence or argument justifies introduction of
suppressed evidence. Whether the defendant directly or indirectly introduces
suppressed statements or physical evidence should be clear enough. Whether
counsel merely asks the jury to consider the importance of missing evidence or to
conclude the prosecution failed to find it, or is otherwise capitalizing on the
prosecution’s disability to explain the reason for its absence—created to protect
the defendant—should also be relatively clear. Even indirect references to the
reasons for the evidence’s non-production such as “You know the prosecution
would produce this evidence if it could” or “You bet it would be here if they found
it” can open the door on this view. The key for counsel is simply to avoid argument
about the reason they did not produce the evidence and focus instead on how its
absence allows for reasonable doubt.
Moreover, as the Rogers court noted, when argument rather than evidence
potentially opens the door, a court can more easily prevent and potentially cure the
problem without admitting the suppressed evidence.182 For defense counsel’s
purposes, arguing the absence of evidence that she establishes the jury should
expect to see if the defendant were guilty will be sufficient. If counsel takes the
next step to argue the evidence’s absence supports the inference the police failed to
find it, the judge can sustain an objection and remind counsel (outside the presence
of the jury) of the consequences. If a sustained objection is not enough to stop it,
the court can also remind the jury they are not to speculate about why they did not
produce the evidence, just evaluate the significance of its absence from the
prosecution’s case. The hint of evidence outside the record on whose absence the
defendant improperly commented should be incentive enough for counsel to
refrain. As a last resort, the court can always admit the suppressed evidence. But
with a rule establishing limits that also makes clear the wide latitude given counsel
(quoting United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1967)); Hunt v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 637, 641–43 (E.D.
Va. 1970) (reasoning defendant’s post-arrest silence admissible to rebut defendant’s testimony that he had offered
an alibi to police at the time of his arrest).
182. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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to take advantage of the absence of suppressed evidence without opening the door,
it is unlikely it would frequently come to that.
III. THE INTEGRITY OF THE TRIAL PROCESS AND ETHICAL RULES
Although setting limits on counsel’s exploitation of evidence’s exclusion
justified by the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the standard for waiving
protection against admission of suppressed evidence proposed in this Article
amounts to naught if it violates prevailing conceptions of the integrity of the trial
process or standards for attorneys’ ethical conduct. The courts have occasionally
used both rationales to justify using ordinary factfinding standards to hold the
defendant opened the door to admission of suppressed evidence. In Johnson, the
court argued the integrity of the judicial system prevented it from “allowing the
defense . . . to misrepresent to the jury the actual facts of the case,” and thus
excluded defense evidence it found was false after considering suppressed proof
inadmissible to rebut the defense evidence.183 The trial court in Fregoso held the
door was opened when there was not “any excuse” for counsel’s actions “except to
mislead the jury,”184 a ruling which was affirmed on appeal with the gloss that
“[a]n attorney commits misconduct by commenting on the adversary’s failure to
produce evidence the attorney knows was excluded by the court.”185 Finally, the
Rogers court also suggested it would be improper for “a lawyer’s questions falsely
[to] suggest a lack of evidence that the lawyer knows exists but which was subject
to pretrial suppression,” even though it could properly “challenge the suffi-
ciency . . . of the State’s proof” by arguing “reasonable doubt . . . when evidence is
lacking . . . using all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evi-
dence.”186 This Part examines those claims and concludes neither the integrity of
the trial process nor a defense lawyer’s ethical duty of candor to the tribunal
prevents counsel from arguing (and attempting to establish through proof) the
prosecution’s case fails to eliminate reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt
because of the absence of suppressed evidence. Consequently, neither claim
justifies a court’s holding such actions open the door to the suppressed evidence.
Within an evidentiary framework holding other goals sometimes trump factfind-
ing accuracy, the integrity of the trial process cannot routinely require an advocate
to refrain from urging a jury to reach conclusions assisted by their ignorance of
evidence that the law excludes in pursuit of those other goals. If it did, application
of any exclusionary rules not premised on factfinding accuracy—including those
excluding plea discussions, settlements, and subsequent remedial measures—
would itself violate that integrity. When the defense lawyer in Fregoso, for
183. People v. Johnson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
184. People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
185. Id. at *17.
186. Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728, 733 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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example, elicits evidence collected at the crime scene to argue there is reasonable
doubt because of the lack of proof connecting him to the evidence collected, the
jury may conclude no such proof exists. But it might reach the same conclusion if
defense counsel elicited nothing beyond what the prosecution elicited about the
inspection of the crime scene and simply argued no physical evidence was
produced, still leaving the jury to reason about what might have been produced,
but was not. In either case, the jury might well be led to a conclusion they would
not otherwise reach were the evidence admitted. But that is hardly to say they have
been misled; we ask them to judge the sufficiency of the prosecution’s case in the
absence of the excluded evidence, and that is exactly what they have done.
Defense evidence of what was collected, if not already introduced by the
prosecution and if showing more than what the jury would already expect to have
been collected, simply allows the defendant to make more effective, though not
improper, use of the suppressed evidence’s exclusion. Of course, by asking the jury
to decide without the benefit of evidence that we would otherwise admit because of
its probativity, we “mislead” them to the extent their exclusive function is to find
the truth of what happened rather than to reach a decision based on the evidence
our law permits. But it is the latter we ask them to do when we ask them to serve in
a system where evidentiary rules occasionally subordinate truthseeking to other
values.
The integrity of the trial process applicable here has a narrower meaning than it
would have if the system were structured to serve the single goal of finding the
truth. Indeed, when the appellate court in Fregoso affirmed because “[a]n attorney
commits misconduct by commenting on the adversary’s failure to produce evi-
dence the attorney knows was excluded by the court,”187 it relied on a case, People
v. Varona,188 that was inapt for many reasons. In Varona, a prosecutor, having
successfully excluded evidence an alleged rape victim was a prostitute who
worked the area where the charged rape occurred, “argued the ‘lack’ of evidence
[the victim worked the area as a prostitute] where the defense was ready and
willing to produce it [and] compounded that tactic by actually arguing that the
[woman] was not a prostitute, although he had seen the official [conviction]
records and knew that he was arguing a falsehood.”189 After finding the trial court
erroneously excluded the evidence, the appellate court concluded the prosecutor’s
“whole argument went beyond the bounds of any acceptable conduct.”190 Reliance
on Verona well-illustrates the pitfalls of indiscriminately applying ideas about
what amounts to misconduct opening the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence
across contexts.
To begin with, Varona involved evidence that was improperly excluded. That
187. Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *17.
188. People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
189. Id. at 46.
190. Id.
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the evidence about whose absence the prosecutor commented should have been
admitted alone distinguishes Varona from cases where evidence is properly
suppressed.191 Where the evidence about whose absence an attorney comments
was improperly excluded, the misconduct, such as it is, simply follows from, and
aggravates, the evidentiary error. Arguing the absence of the proof per se is not
misconduct absent the wrongful exclusion of the evidence.192 Moreover, if proper,
the exclusion of the victim’s prostitution was based on reasons linked to the
evidence’s probative value and capacity for prejudice inapplicable once the
prosecutor himself made an issue of her other sexual behavior,193 which is exactly
what he did.194 Excluding the proof only to assert its absence when raising the
issue whose closure justifies exclusion was an attempt to have it both ways not
contemplated by the rule, even if it excluded the prostitution evidence in the first
place.195 Finally, the prosecutor made an issue of the victim’s other sexual
behavior only after it was too late for the court easily to reverse the ruling premised
on the prosecution’s not doing so.196 Having engaged in strategic delay to make
unilateral use of an improperly applied rule which, even when properly applied,
allows or excludes evidence equally from both sides, the prosecutor surely
committed misconduct by, inter alia, commenting on the failure to produce
evidence that he had excluded. But that provides no support for the proposition
defense counsel does wrong to argue the failure to produce evidence properly
suppressed by the constitutional exclusionary rule, whose purpose requires that the
prosecution suffer adverse inferences from the evidence’s absence.
Also, Varona involved a prosecutor, not a defense lawyer. While both, like all
lawyers, are enjoined from offering evidence they “know[] to be false,”197 their
obligations differ when it comes to ethical use of evidence—or its absence—that
does not fall into that category. A prosecutor has a special duty not to impede the
191. See, e.g., People v. Daggett, 275 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting the prosecutor improperly
misleads the jury by asking the jurors to draw an inference they might not have drawn if they had heard the
evidence the judge erroneously excluded); cf. People v. Herrera, No. E051246, 2011 WL 2120214 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 31, 2011) (holding it was not improper for prosecutor to argue the jury did not hear evidence the defendant
chose not to introduce after the court deferred ruling on its admissibility rather than erroneously excluded the
evidence).
192. Herrera, No. E051246, 2011 WL 2120214, at *10 (asserting it is permissible to argue the absence of
evidence that the defendant chose not to present).
193. See State v. Williams, 477 N.E.2d 221, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (finding where alleged forcible rape
victim testified on direct examination that as a lesbian she never consented to sexual intercourse with men,
thereby putting her own sexual past at issue, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against
him was violated as such right outweighed the interests of the state in excluding this type of evidence.
Furthermore, “as the victim put her own sexual past in issue on direct examination, she waived the protections of
[the rape shield laws] as far as any evidence of her past sexual conduct which was directly probative of and
relevant to a material element of the charged crime.”).
194. People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
195. See discussion supra notes 85–88.
196. The prosecutor’s assertions were not made until summation. See Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
197. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012).
100 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:59
truth that does not apply to defense attorneys.198 In fact, inasmuch as the truth may
be that a defendant is guilty, and zealous representation nonetheless entails finding
fault with the prosecution’s case, it has been said that “it is generally agreed that
defense counsel’s ethical duty to represent his client zealously includes an
affirmative duty to impede the search of truth.”199 In United States v. Wade, the
Court wrote:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the
criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding
the commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is
not adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable
obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different
mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the
innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his
client whether he is innocent or guilty.200
Thus, the prosecutor’s using the absence of the prostitution evidence he
excluded in Verona to suggest the victim engaged in no such activity, and defense
counsel’s using the absence of physical evidence she suppressed in Fregoso to
suggest he was not at the scene are treated quite differently, although both may
impede the jury from finding the truth. A prosecutor has an obligation to the truth
to avoid inferences disproved by excluded evidence. No obligation to refrain from
arguing inferences misdirecting the jury from the truth as indicated by suppressed
evidence requires defense counsel to avoid using its absence to show a reasonable
doubt. Verona provides no support for the Fregoso court’s claim “[defense
counsel] commit[ted] misconduct by commenting on the adversary’s failure to
produce evidence the attorney knows was excluded by the court.”201 While there
may be such situations, defense counsel’s arguing the absence of suppressed
evidence establishes reasonable doubt is not one of them.
The Varona court’s observation that the prosecutor compounded his error by
“actually arguing the woman was not a prostitute although he had seen the official
[conviction] records and knew he was arguing a falsehood,”202 is also inapplicable
to Fregoso. Defense counsel was hardly guilty of arguing a falsehood by pointing
out the lack of physical evidence placing the defendant at the scene. As the Varona
court recognized, pointing out the lack of evidence of a fact and affirmatively
198. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 316 (2001). This
duty is “special” in that it is unique to prosecutors. See id. at 316 n.38 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
256–58 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)).
199. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–58 (1926) (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part)).
200. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–57 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
201. People v. Fregoso, No. F050895, 2008 WL 1850973, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
202. People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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asserting its opposite are not the same thing.203 Even if the asserted fact is true, it is
misconduct for an attorney to put himself in the position of being a witness by
making a factual assertion that reflects his personal knowledge or belief because it
invites the jury to speculate about off-record evidence.204 Thus the assertion in
Varona that the victim was not a prostitute would be improper quite apart from
whether the prosecutor had successfully suppressed evidence of her prostitution to
the extent it was not supported by inferences from evidence in the record.205 In the
absence of such proof, the jury could not understand the assertion as an argument
about what the evidence showed or failed to show, leaving it to rely on the
prosecutor’s presumed extra-record knowledge of the matter.
Defense counsel in Fregoso made no such argument. The court acknowledged
she had merely pointed out the lack of evidence of the defendant’s presence at the
crime scene and did nothing to suggest extra-record knowledge that he had not
been there. Indeed, even by the court’s account, defense counsel had not phrased
her argument about a lack of physical evidence connecting the defendant to the
scene generally, rather than a lack of such evidence produced at trial.206 Thus the
court could not have worried counsel was possibly making an argument that was
literally false (there was, in fact, some such evidence, though not admitted) even if
the distinction would be lost on the jury instructed evidence consists only of proof
203. Id. (arguing the victim was not a prostitute compounded the error in arguing the lack of evidence of
prostitution).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 452 (1st Cir. 1970) (“Essentially, the prosecutor is to argue
the case. He may discuss the evidence, the warrantable inferences, the witnesses, and their credibility. He may talk
about the duties of the jury, the importance of the case, and anything else that is relevant. He is not to interject his
personal beliefs. The prosecutor is neither a witness, a mentor, nor a ‘thirteenth juror . . . .’”); Greenberg v. United
States, 280 F.2d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 1960) (“To permit counsel to express his personal belief in the testimony (even
if not phrased so as to suggest knowledge of additional evidence not known to the jury), would afford him a
privilege not even accorded to witnesses under oath and subject to cross-examination. Worse, it creates the false
issue of the reliability and credibility of counsel. This is peculiarly unfortunate if one of them has the advantage of
official backing. The resolution of questions of credibility of testimony is for impartial jurors and judges. The fact
that government counsel is, as he says, an advocate is the very reason why he should not impinge upon this
quasi-judicial function. We believe the canon to be elemental and fundamental.”); see also NEW YORK RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d)(4) (2012) (“A lawyer shall not . . . assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012) (“A lawyer shall not . . . (e) . . . as-
sert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the
justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused . . . .”). See generally James W. Gunson, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between “Personal
Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241 (1994).
205. It is improper for counsel to sum up on evidence beyond that admitted at trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Quinn 467 F.2d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1972) (“It is well settled that the arguments of counsel must be confined to the
issues of the case, the applicable law, pertinent evidence, and such legitimate inferences as may properly be
drawn.”) (citing Wakaksan v. United States, 367 F.2d 639, 646 (8th Cir. 1966)). These rules are all versions of the
idea that attorneys must confine their arguments to the world of evidence admitted at trial.
206. Fregoso, 2008 WL 1850973, at *16 (arguing “there was no evidence presented by the prosecution
connecting my client to the cornfield”) (emphasis added).
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admitted at trial.207 Thus counsel was careful in summation to argue the evidence,
and even then careful to direct her comments to the evidence produced at trial
rather than to evidence that might otherwise exist, although unnecessary in this
context.208
That is not to say counsel would not have crossed the line into misconduct by
asserting there was no evidence found connecting the defendant to the scene. That
claim would be literally false and potentially construed by the jury as counsel’s
assertion of a fact unsupported by a record that did not affirmatively address, much
less show, the absence of such extrajudicial proof. The misconduct, however, is no
broader than the actions discussed in the previous Part as triggering a waiver.209
Should counsel err, the court would need to ask whether the error merited
introduction of suppressed counter-proof rather than interruption of the argument,
unless counsel persists in his claim.210 A jury instructed to decide based on the
evidence or lack of evidence admitted at trial that is not speculating about the
possibility of extrajudicial proof will find no significant difference between the
claims that no evidence was found and no evidence was produced at trial that
connected the defendant to the scene.211 Nonetheless, counsel’s repeated attempts
to establish that nothing was found should waive protection against the suppressed
evidence.212 The integrity of the factfinding process demands as much even though
factfinding would hardly be improved. Conversely, factfinding integrity—rather
than accuracy—does not require counsel be prohibited from arguing the inferences
from the absence of suppressed evidence for the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
case. As the Payne court recognized, the integrity of the process in this context is
properly protected by preventing defense counsel from affirmatively misrepresent-
ing the prosecution’s investigation while allowing her to exploit suppression of its
unlawful fruits.213 The Rogers Court had it exactly right when it said although
counsel could draw all inferences from the absence of proof to establish reasonable
doubt, he could not “falsely suggest a lack of evidence that the lawyer knows
207. See JOHN S. SIFFERT ET AL., 1–2 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 2.01 (Matthew Bender
2012) (“The evidence before you consists of the answers given by witnesses—the testimony they gave, as you
recall it—and the exhibits that were received in evidence . . . . You may also consider the stipulations of the
parties as evidence.”); PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
§ 3.04 (2012) (“The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are consists of sworn testimony of
witnesses, both on direct and cross-examination, regardless of who called the witness; the exhibits that have been
received into evidence; and any facts to which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated . . . . You are permitted to
draw from facts that you find to have been proven such reasonable inferences as you believe are justified in the
light of common sense and personal experience.”).
208. Since the jury is instructed evidence consists of that admitted at trial, it is usually redundant for counsel to
refer to evidence “received at trial.”
209. See supra Part II.D.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 181–82.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. People v. Payne, 456 N.E.2d 44, 47 (Ill. 1983).
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exists.”214 The “lack of evidence” to which it referred was the improper suggestion
that evidence had not been found, not the proper argument that, considering all
reasonable inferences from the proof, the absence of certain evidence at trial
establishes reasonable doubt.215 As these courts show, there is no reason to think
the constitutional exclusionary rule—like other rules excluding evidence for
reasons besides probativity—cannot be part of the fabric of factfinding integrity.
Effectively using the absence of suppressed evidence to establish reasonable
doubt also does not violate a lawyer’s obligation of candor to the tribunal. Ethical
rules prohibit a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer “knows to be false”
while allowing (though not requiring) a lawyer to “refuse to offer evidence, other
than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false.”216 These rules are justified, in part, by the need to protect “the
integrity of the adjudicative process,” which requires the lawyer prevent the
tribunal from being “misled by false statements of . . . fact or evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false.”217 While the comments, when addressing the lawyer’s
responsibility to disclose a client’s false testimony, speak of “subverting the
truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement,”218 the
obligation falls well short of imposing a responsibility on the defense lawyer for
the factfinder’s conclusions that would prevent him from introducing evidence or
making arguments that the suppressed evidence contradicts.219
First, the likelihood the suppressed evidence would rise to the level of establish-
ing the attorney “knows” that evidence contradicting the suppressed proof is false
is remote. “Knows” in this context means “actual knowledge,”220 and although
that knowledge “may be inferred from circumstances,”221 it must “ordinarily [be]
based on admissions the client has made to the lawyers.”222 In any event, no court
in the cases discussed in this Article remotely suggested counsel had engaged in an
ethical violation of this sort. Indeed, the evidence defense counsel sought to
elicit—the misidentification in Johnson, the collection of specimens in Fregoso,
even the existence of the search in Payne—was true, and the only issue was the
inference that the factfinder might draw in the absence of contradictory, but
214. Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728, 733 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
215. Id.
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012).
217. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2012).
218. Id. at cmt. 11.
219. I am assuming here the suppressed evidence does not rise to the level of establishing that the attorney
“knows” the evidence contradicting the suppressed proof is false, as would rarely be the case. See infra notes
220–22 and accompanying text. Moreover, “false” in this context generally refers to the evidence itself rather than
to the inferences that may be drawn from it. So the cases focus on a lawyer’s knowledge of a witness’s perjury, not
on whether a witness’s truthful testimony might induce the factfinder to reach a false conclusion. See infra notes
223–25 and accompanying text.
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2012).
221. Id.
222. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).
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suppressed evidence.223 The ethical rules do not make the defense lawyer respon-
sible for that inference, just as she is not responsible for furthering the quest for
truth.224 For instance, the rules specifically do not require lawyers to avoid
presenting evidence even if they reasonably believe it (but do not know it) to be
false.225 It merely creates an option to do so. If the lawyer is not responsible for the
factfinder’s potentially inaccurate conclusion after presenting evidence he reason-
ably believes is false, it cannot follow that he is bound to refrain from presenting
truthful evidence that may mislead in the absence of suppressed evidence.
Second, even when there is an obligation not to present testimony because it is
known to the lawyer to be false, that obligation may yield to other goals, such as
the defendant’s right to testify. Thus the rules contemplate that the defense
lawyer’s responsibility is not to the accuracy of factfinding per se, but rather to the
integrity of the process designed to produce truth within boundaries sometimes
established by competing goals. The rules, for instance, clearly distinguish
between the lawyer’s obligation to the “tribunal”226 and to the factfinder.227 The
lawyer’s responsibility ends at notifying the court of testimony he knows to be
false if the client is unwilling to cooperate in further remedial action, leaving it to
the court “to determine what should be done—making a statement about the matter
to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.”228 In no event is the
defense lawyer directly responsible for the accuracy of factfinding rather than to
the court, which we charge with protecting the integrity of an adjudicative process
whose rules sometimes subordinate accurate factfinding to other goals.
The candor-to-the-tribunal rules dovetail with trial conduct and other ethical
rules to reinforce the advocate’s limited responsibility for the outcome. The rules
require advocates to avoid making themselves witnesses in cases they argue, to
avoid appearing to have personal knowledge of events at issue in the trial, and to
refrain from making arguments beyond those supported by the evidentiary record
(which, as stated, does not contain their testimony).229 The advocate should not be
making any statements based on personal knowledge which the factfinder can
223. “False” in this context thus refers to the evidence itself rather than to the inferences that may be drawn
from it. So the cases focus on a lawyer’s knowledge a witness has testified or intends to testify falsely, not on
whether his testimony might induce the factfinder to reach a potentially false conclusion in the absence of other
evidence.
224. See supra text accompanying note 210.
225. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012).
226. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2012) (“‘Tribunal’ denotes a court, an arbitrator in a
binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative
capacity.”).
227. See, e.g., Salazar v. Patel, No. 00CECG11130, 2007 WL 2019803, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2007)
(distinguishing between judge, which is encompassed within term ‘tribunal” under Rule 3.3, and jury, which as
fact-finder, is not).
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2012).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 204–05.
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properly consider as evidence. Consequently, “the false statements . . . of fact”230
from which the advocate must refrain are those made to the court in its supervisory
role; otherwise the advocate’s role is not to make statements of fact at all, unless
they are statements about the evidence—in effect, descriptions of others’ state-
ments and assertions—made while arguing the inferences the advocate would have
the factfinder draw from them. Before the jury, the advocate is required to act as if
he only has personal knowledge of the proof adduced at trial, not of external
factual matters relevant to the case. The advocate does not violate the duty to
refrain from knowing presentation of evidence she knows, or even reasonably
believes, is false by accurately describing the evidence (or lack thereof) and
arguing its significance for deciding whether a party has met its burden of proof.
There is simply no fraud on the tribunal in taking advantage of the absence of
evidence about which the court surely knows, having excluded it by virtue of
evidentiary rules.231 Nor is there any fraud in truthfully asserting the absence of
that evidence while asking the factfinder to consider its absence when deciding
whether certain facts have been adequately proved. Indeed, there is nothing in the
rules suggesting there is any fraud in calling a witness to testify to matters which,
although true, support an inference inconsistent with the excluded proof, and then
to urge the factfinder to draw the inference. Far from it; that is exactly what we
should expect a defense lawyer to do when zealously representing his client within
an adversarial system.232
Zealous advocacy that uses the absence of suppressed evidence to show the
weakness of the prosecution’s case, but does not affirmatively misrepresent the
facts of the investigation, is consistent with the integrity of a factfinding process
that draws a prudential, but significant line between withholding evidence from
juries for a variety of reasons and asking them to consider false proof. A prepared
investigator who participated in an illegal search knows that an innocuous “What
happened next?” question from the prosecutor does not justify describing an illegal
search, but he is not prohibited from describing the search should defense counsel
ask about it. Where rules exclude evidence at all, including those intended only to
promote accurate factfinding, we understand the necessity of distinguishing
between a witness’s telling the whole truth, and truly answering questions while
omitting inadmissible evidence unless specifically asked about it.233 The same
distinction informs opening the door to evidence suppressed by the exclusionary
rules. Arguments urging jurors to conclude the prosecution did not produce
230. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012).
231. United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190 (2004).
232. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 316 (2001) (noting
zealous representation can require defense counsel in the adversary system to impede the search for truth by
finding fault with the prosecution’s case).
233. See Bruce A. Green, The Whole Truth: How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 699 (1992).
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suppressed evidence because investigators failed to find it entail a waiver similar to
that which would occur if defense counsel asked investigators whether they found
additional evidence. In effect, the waiver reflects a morality appropriate to
preserving the integrity of the jury’s particular role; it prevents the exclusionary
rule from requiring jurors to rely on evidence that is equivalent to testimony that
could not have been given truthfully—effectively a lie—though, by necessity, they
do not get to hear inadmissible evidence that might prevent them from inferring a
false fact. The test suggested here respects the distinction between the equivalent
of false testimony, unnecessary to accomplish exclusion’s legitimate goals, and
potentially false inferences drawn from the absence of proof, a necessary conse-
quence of any rules excluding relevant evidence. It is entirely consistent with the
integrity of the trial process and the ethical standards governing all its partici-
pants.234
CONCLUSION
Courts holding defendants open the door to suppressed evidence by using
exclusion as a “sword” to elicit proof or make arguments contradicted by that
evidence negate the exclusionary rule’s incentive to forego unlawful investigatory
steps that the Supreme Court holds is necessary. Their reasoning applies concep-
tions about what opens the door to evidence excluded for reasons of accurate
factfinding that are inapt when applied to rules justified by other goals. Whether a
party opens the door to evidence excluded by a particular rule must be a contextual
decision based on what the rule seeks to accomplish. If acquiring evidence
unlawfully benefits the prosecution by preventing the defendant from introducing
evidence or arguing inferences rebutted by that proof, the constitutional exclusion-
ary rule’s deterrent function is removed once the prosecution has a legally
sufficient case.
234. Recently, Professor Pettys argued that the exclusionary rule violates Kantian morality because withhold-
ing evidence interferes with jurors’ moral integrity as autonomous actors. See Todd E. Pettys, Instrumentalizing
Jurors: An Argument Against The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 837 at 844, 854
(2010) [hereinafter Pettys, Instrumentalizing Jurors]; Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application Of Exclusionary
Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 463 at 480–86, 508 [hereinafter Pettys, Immoral Application]. He thus equates
withholding evidence from jurors with lying to them, in violation of Kant’s categorical imperative. See Pettys,
Instrumentalizing Jurors, supra at 849; Pettys, Immoral Application, supra at 468 (“[J]urors possess a moral right
to see and hear all of the relevant, readily available evidence.”). It is hardly clear that Kant would agree, even at
his most categorical. As Professor Mahon points out, Kant’s “duty to be truthful is not the duty to be candid,” and
so “does not cover what is sometimes called ‘a lie of omission.’” James E. Mahon, Kant on Lies, Candour and
Reticence, 7 KANTIAN REV. 101, 123 (2003). So even if Kant is correct that one ought not lie to a murderer about
the location of his intended victim, he also argues that there is no duty to provide him with that information, even
in circumstances where one knows that, in its absence, the murderer will reach a false conclusion about his
victim’s whereabouts. See id. (“The duty to be truthful . . . does not prohibit engaging in non-mendacious
linguistic deception when the goal is . . . to avert an evil.”). Mahon reads Kant as distinguishing the categorical
duty not to lie from the absence of a categorical duty to provide information, even where necessary to prevent the
putative recipient from reaching a false conclusion, a position consistent with the integrity of our trial process
which includes rules excluding relevant evidence.
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Courts allowing such evidence justify their decisions by arguing the integrity of
the factfinding process requires they prevent juries from being misled about the
facts or from concluding that suppressed evidence does not exist. The integrity of
the factfinding process, however, is protected by holding defendants waive
protection against suppressed proof by themselves using illegally-obtained evi-
dence or by asking jurors to consider why suppressed evidence was not produced.
This waiver rule allows the exclusionary rule to perform its deterrent function
without violating ethical standards for trial conduct or the jury’s accepted role as
arbiters of the closed universe of evidence admitted for their consideration.
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